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Art Speech
Marci A. Hamilton 49 Vand. L. Rev. 73 (1996)
Although many scholars have been in favor of providing first amend-
ment protection for art, no one has offered a justification for its constitutional
protection suited to art's singular capacities. Rather, commentators and
courts have been inclined to place art under the rubric of general speech,
which limits protection to ideas and content. Professor Hamilton argues that
art offers significantly more than its content and deserves first amendment
protection tailored to its particular potential. Art enables individuals to
experience unfamiliar worlds and thereby to gain new perspectives on the pre-
vailing status quo, including the government's. It performs this function
without exposing the individual to the risks inherent in actually experiencing
a foreign world view. Moreover, its subversive potential not only occurs at the
moment artwork is experienced but also can be stored, making art a powerful
and immanent tool of critique.
Professor Hamilton concludes that governmental funding of art
projects should be examined with the closest scrutiny, because governmental
involvement in the art market skews the market away from works that
defamiliarize. Finally, public funding of arts education and appreciation
should be a high priority so that students can build a storehouse of
reorientation experiences that will protect them against the bewitchment of
common sense posed by official power.
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"If I could say it, I wouldn't have to dance it."
-Isadora Duncan
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically and consistently, American culture has treated art
as inconsequential to the democratic enterprise.' Under the Puritan
tradition, art has been treated as a fillip to the good life-enjoyable,
but inessential.2 By regarding art as mere entertainment, the culture
1. See Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the Killing Jar, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 367, 368 (1994)
( We pretend that law and art have nothing to do with one another").
By "art" I do not mean any particular set of objectively determined characteristics but
rather the group of works valued by a particular culture at a given time. See generally Terry
Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (U. Minn., 1983).
My project is limited to describing art's capacities in a republican democracy. By way of
clarification, I am not making either of the larger arguments that all art is necessarily subver-
sive or that all that is subversive is necessarily art. Nor am I suggesting that anything which is
art might not also carry a political message. In the latter instance, first amendment protection
can be predicated on both its artistic elements and its political speech. Whether a particular
work is art in a particular case is a question of fact better left to a case-by-case determination.
Most works are easily identifiable as art. For works on the margins, the judge would have to
make a judgment call, employing the views of the parties' competing expert witnesses.
Undoubtedly, this is not a perfect scheme but it is the best that can be expected in a litigation
setting. Some works deserving of protection will not be protected under this scenario and others
not deserving may be protected. Given the conservative bent of most judicial decision making,
the former is the more serious worry and warrants a warning to judges that the range of
artworks is not a static universe. Judges are already engaged in a similar inquiry in construing
the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat 5128 (Dec. 1, 1990), codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1994 ed.). See, for example, Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71
F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing whether an installation sculpture is "a work of visual art as
defined by VARA"). See also Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 Yale L.
J. 1369 (1990) (pointing out the difficulties of providing a static definition of the universe of
artworks).
2. See, for example, Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 27 (1971) (agreeing that an analogy exists between criticizing the
government and publishing a novel "like Ulysses, for the latter may form attitudes that ulti-
mately affect politics. But it is also an analogy, not an identity.... If the dialectical progres-
sion is not to become an analogical stampede, the protection of the first amendment.., must be
cut off when it reaches the outer limits of political speech").
Protestant culture has set the tone for the American indifference to the larger societal value
of art. The early American Puritans viewed art not as an evil but rather as frivolous. John
Dillenberger and Claude Welch, Protestant Christianity: Interpreted Through Its Development
105 (Scribner, 1954). The entirety of life was to be organized under God and for God. Id. at 104-
05. Pastimes such as literature were considered nonessential. Many a Puritan man was well-
read in fine literature, but the Puritan social order warned against being sidetracked from "the
main business of life." Id. at 105. In general, the dominant religious faith of the American
culture, Protestantism, especially Lutheranism and Calvinism, has treated art as little more
than ornamental. See generally David Morgan, The Protestant Struggle with the Image, 1989
Christian Century 308. It is distracting. Theologian Joseph Sittler makes a related point that
Christians have a tendency to "walk through the world holding [their] noses, as it were, as if
God's creation somehow smelled bad and [they] ought not to get too close to it." Joseph Sittler,
Provocations on the Church and the Arts, 1986 Christian Century 291, 291. The trivialization of
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has underestimated its instrumental, liberty-reinforcing role in a
representative democracy. This Article employs literary and
sociological theory to explain the links between art, democracy, and
liberty.3
A striking indication of American society's underestimation of
art's power resides in a first amendment jurisprudence that only
tangentially acknowledges the force of art. First amendment doctrine
foregrounds political speech as having the highest political value and
obscenity as utterly valueless. At the same time, it largely ignores
the liberty value of art.4 Another indication of this country's under-
art in the larger culture is duly reflected in the legal world. See notes 120-24 and accompanying
text.
The Puritans nevertheless contributed to the challenge structure of American government.
"[Wiorkable democratic structures have arisen primarily in lands influenced by Puritan tradi-
tions." Dillenberger and Welch, Protestant Christianity at 106. Their understanding of the
importance of decentralizing power and their foundational belief in the necessity of challenging
systems of power, whether it be the church or the state have proved durable and important. Id.
3. The self-conscious attacks of modernism and postmodernism on the prevailing defini-
tion of fine art have aggravated the American culture's tendency to undervalue art's larger,
societal value. For discussion of the art world's marginalization of itself, see John Roberts,
Postmodernism: Politics and Art 15 (Manchester U., 1990) (discussing the postmodernists'
"indifference, in the name of political and aesthetic contingency, to an understanding of art as
grounded in articulatory struggle within a hegemonic culture" (emphasis omitted)); David
Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism 12-13
(Crossroad, 1981) (recognizing art's increasing marginalization in our society "[wihether avant-
garde artists or countercultural movements ... have chosen or have simply recognized their
effective absence from the realm of the people"); id. at 13 (observing that many artists "accept
their marginalized status in society"); Jos6 Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art, in
James B. Hall and Barry Ulanov, eds., Modern Culture and the Arts 39, 42, 46 (McGraw-Hill,
1967) (summing up the "peculiarities of modern art" in the "one feature of its renouncing its
importance").
In an intensely self-referential way, the fine art world has spoken increasingly to itself
about itself in a manner that is inaccessible to the general public, in terms such as Dadaism,
pop art, abstract art, and appropriative art. Sean O'Casey, The Arts Among the Multitude, in
Hall and Ulanov, eds., Modern Culture and the Arts at 15, 17. See generally Abraham Kaplan,
The Aesthetics of the Popular Arts, in Hall and Ulanov, eds., Modern Culture and the Arts at 62.
Although many have mistaken this internal dialogue as evidence of the death of art, it is
not. See Arthur C. Danto, The End of Art, in Berel Lang, ed., The Death of Art 5, 21 (Haven,
1984); id. at 6 (stating the possibility "that art itself has no future, though artworks may still be
produced post-historically... in an aftershock of a vanished vitality"). Rather, it serves as proof
that the art world itself is not immune to art's capacity to undermine the status quo.
4. For a discussion of political speech and obscenity cases, see notes 125-46 and
accompanying text. Judge Richard Posner has offered an interesting and plausible summary of
the reasons why the federal judiciary in particular has found it difficult to extend first
amendment protection to nude dancing, even if identified as a form of art. He states that the
judiciary is disinclined to protect nude dancing under the First Amendment:
in part because we are either middle-aged or elderly men, in part because we tend to be
snooty about popular culture, in part because as public officials we have a natural ten-
dency to think political expression more important than artistic expression, in part be-
cause we are Americans-which means that we have been raised in a culture in which
puritanism, philistinism, and promiscuity are complexly and often incongruously inter-
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valuation of art is the public education system's continuing history of
marginalizing arts education. 5 Yet another is the fact that neither the
Court nor legal scholars have felt compelled to provide a particularly
well-suited theoretical justification for art's first amendment treat-
ment.6
The inclination to bracket art from the political culture is not
unique to the American experiment with representative democracy.
Conventional readings of Plato, for example, indicate that he believed
that art should be censored because it threatens order and stability7
Yet, art is essential to a representative democracy because it can be
subversive. Unchallenged and entrenched orders threaten freedom.8
Art permits individuals to experience alternative worlds, thereby
providing an efficient and effective means of testing the status quo
without risk.9  Plato's fear of art was warranted-art can be
destabilizing-but his censorship prescription is treacherous to liberty
overall. In biological terms, stasis is death; only growth and change
keep the organism alive.1 Representative democratic government
woven-and in part because like all lawyers we are formalists who believe deep down
that the words in statutes and the Constitution mean what they say, and a striptease is
not a speech.
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1100 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring),
rev'd sub nom., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
5. Howard Gardner, Art Education and Human Development 35 (Getty, 1990) ("[A]rt
education has continued to be seen as a vehicle for promoting self-expression, imagination,
creativity, and knowledge of one's affective life-not as a scholastic subject'). In the mid- to
late-nineteenth century, arts education was most prominent in "affluent circles" and could not
be found generally in "ordinary... scholastic settings." Id. at 34. Today, as children progress
with their education, "art classes wane in frequency" and the "study of the artistic practices of
the past has not been considered relevant to youthful production." Id. at x.
6. See notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
7. See Francis M. Cornford, trans., The Republic of Plato bk. 10 (Clarendon, 1941). See
also Sheldon Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime,
and the First Amendment, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 221, 224 n.12, 227 (noting that Plato considered art
so powerful that his ideal Republic required that the state control art for the good of society).
8. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 47-54 (1983); Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief! Conduct Paradigm
in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to
Protect Religious Conduct, 54 Ohio St. L. J. 713, 725, 772 (1993).
9. See Part II.B.
10. See J.H. Woodger, Biological Principles: A Critical Study 442 (Routledge & K. Paul,
1967) ("Change is apt to be contrasted with 'permanence' or 'persistence,' but in the organism
both notions are involved, for we see that continual intrinsic change is essential to its
persistence, and.., that causal regularities are themselves 'permanences in nature' "); Arthur
J. Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1647,
1660-61, 1668 (1989) (recognizing the requirement of change in autopoietic systems).
The study of ecosystems reveals a correlation between a system's relative stability or
resilience and its spatial and temporal homogeneity or heterogeneity. The more diverse
the subsystems, the more resilient the overall system. Resilience corresponds to a sys-
tem's ability to absorb perturbations and evolve into a metastable level of organization
characterized by renewed entropy production. Whereas the degree of fluctuation around
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thrives on this paradox: it is legitimated more by external challenge
than by the entrenchment of its institutions.
While it is generally accepted that the First Amendment con-
templates protection of art," the questions why and to what extent
have not been satisfactorily answered to date. In this Article, I posit
that art cannot receive its due as long as attempts to justify its place
in the pantheon of first amendment freedoms are focused only upon
the protection of ideas or information. Art can carry ideas and
information, but it also goes beyond logical, rational, and discursive
communication. It provides a risk-free opportunity to live in other
worlds, enlarging individual perspective and strengthening individual
judgment.
A strong analogy can be drawn between the protection of art
and the protection of religion, which also cannot be fully explained by
reference to its content. For art to be fully and strongly protected, the
existing interpretations of the First Amendment's Speech Clause, all
of which turn on the protection of ideas or information,12 should be
understood as partial justifications for a limited category of speech.
Art and religion form a prism through which the First Amendment is
transformed from a haven for ideas to a means of protecting vital
spheres of personal freedom. These spheres are anathema to totali-
tarian regimes and crucial to securing liberty alongside a representa-
tive democracy.
Art and the artistic community construct paths out of repres-
sion.13 Understood from this perspective, art should be at the center
specific states is a function of stability, survival and extinction are functions of resil-
ience. A system which is very resilient can have a very low stability-that is, it may
fluctuate greatly-but survive. Conversely, a system with high stability may lack resil-
ience such that any change or disturbance simply destroys the system.
Alicia Juarrero-Roqu6, Fail-Safe Versus Safe-Fail: Suggestions Toward an Evolutionary Model
of Justice, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1745, 1749 (1991) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, the theory of
dissipative structures created under nonequilibriun conditions recognizes that "nonequilibrium
may be a source of order." Id. at 1747 (quoting Ilya Prigogine, From Being to Becoming: Time
and Complexity in the Phyical Sciences 81 (W.H. Freeman, 1980)).
11. See Part IV.A.1.
12. See notes 124-39 and accompanying text.
13. See, for example, Robert J. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism
471 (Norton, 1989) (citing "the artistic" as one of the "alternatives to totalism'); Steven Lukes,
Introduction, in John Keane, ed., The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in
Central Eastern Europe 11-12 (Sharpe, Paul Wilson trans. 1985) (citing Czech writer Vaclav
Benda's call for a "cultural underground," including rock music, graphic art, alternative theatre,
and unofficial publishing, as important in the Czech reform movement); Vaclav Benda,
Catholicism and Politics, in Keane, ed., The Power of the Powerless at 120 (stating that the
cultural underground formed "one of the largest identifiable constituencies" of the Czech reform
movement). See also Timothy G. Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in
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of our efforts to understand and promote the anti-tyranny mission of
the First Amendment.14 Accordingly, first amendment jurisprudence
should reflect art's integral role in preserving the constitutional bal-
ance between the governed and the governing.15 The existing juris-
prudence falls far short of this goal.16
This Article offers a theory within a theory: it posits that rep-
resentative democracy demands means of challenging government
and that art performs this function in a singular way. In Part II, I
articulate a theory of representative democracy that requires a
strong, liberty-reinforcing First Amendment, and I set forth art's
integral function in a successful representative democracy. In short,
art provides the opportunity to experience alternative worlds and
therefore to gain distance and perspective on the prevailing status
quo. Part III provides empirical examples that illustrate art's
destabilizing potential and the hand-in-glove relationship between
totalitarian regimes and art censorship. In Part IV, I describe the
existing treatment of art in American jurisprudence, and I paint with
broad strokes what art's constitutional power-as described in Part
II-portends for first amendment doctrine and for public funding
related to art. In short, art should receive the most stringent first
amendment protection; governmental funding of art should be strictly
scrutinized; and arts education in the public schools serves important
constitutional ends and therefore should be a high priority.
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague 81-82, 121 (Random House, 1990) (noting the active and
prominent role that drama students and actors played in the Czech reform movement).
Dedicated to helping ensure democracy in Eastern Europe, the Soros Foundation has poured
millions of dollars into supporting the literature and the arts in those countries. Between 1990
and 1992 the Soros Foundation established sixteen new foundations in formerly communist
countries and gave over $30 million annually to fund programs including scholarships and
travel grants for writers, filmmakers, newspapers, magazines, and theatre. Connie Bruck, The
World According to Soros, New Yorker 54, 64-65, 72 (Jan. 23, 1995).
14. See Part IV.A.2.
15. See id.
16. See Part IV.A.1.
[Vol. 49:73
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II. THE ENTROPIC AND VITAL FUNCTION OF ART IN A REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY
Self-preservation cannot be achieved merely by following principles; it depends
on the realization of human potentials, and these can only be brought to light
by literature, not by systematic discourse.
17
Systems of power, once in place, tend to perpetuate themselves
and to become encrusted and unresponsive to external demands for
accommodation. 18 In other words, they tend to resist change as they
become increasingly self-defining and self-referential.19 The only force
that will keep freedom alive is that which irritates the behemoth.20
The source of the behemoth in the American experience-the scheme
of representative democratic government-and the constitutional
safeguards against its potential abuses must be delineated before the
necessity of art's destabilizing power can be fully appreciated.
17. Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response 76 (Johns Hopkins
U., 1978).
18. See Niklas Luhmann, Ecological Communication 16 (U. Chicago, John Bednarz, Jr.
trans. 1989) ("[Slociety does not have to react to its environment"); id. ("[T]he system uses its
boundaries to screen itself off from environmental influences and produces only very selective
interconnections [with the surrounding and challenging environment]").
This phenomenon is evident in the critique of the Catholic Church levelled by Protestants
during the Reformation and of the Protestant Church by the Puritans, and the Churches'
reaction (or lack thereof) to these demands for change. See Roland H. Bainton, The Reformation
of the Sixteenth Century 59-61 (Beacon, 1952) (describing the trial of Martin Luther before the
Diet of Worms, which had been "turned into a church council," where Luther refused to repudi-
ate portions of his teachings and was "put under the ban of the Empire before being subjected to
the excommunication of the Church"); id. at 65 (narrating Luther's banishment of Carlstadt who
had embraced elements of a program anticipating English Puritanism); Harold J. Grimm, The
Reformation Era, 1500-1650 at 478 (MacMillan, 1969) (observing that, because the Puritans
were "[o]pposed both to the all-inclusiveness of Anglicanism and the rigidity of Calvinism as
being unscriptural, they proposed a church without ritual and a learned ministry"); Pierre
Janelle, The Catholic Reformation 8, 11 (Bruce, 1951) (demonstrating how "the main obstacle to
reformation in the Church was the complicated entanglement of vested interests," and noting
"how tempting it was for the members of the [Catholic Church's] hierarchy to neglect dioceses in
which they met the resistance on every hand").
The isolation of the power elite is also fundamental to the Marxist critique of culture, which
operates on the notion that the ideology of the power structure is enslaving. See Karl Marx, On
Society and Social Change 19 (U. Chicago, Neil J. Smelser ed. 1973) (describing the basis of the
state as arising from the need to monitor class antagonism and infighting therefore resulting in
a state "of the most powerful, economically ruling class, which by its means becomes also the
politically ruling class, and so acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed
class"); Ralph Milibrand, The State and the Ruling Class, in Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode,
eds., Readings in Marxist Sociology 132 (Clarendon, 1983) (noting the Marxist argument that
"the state is an essential means of class domination").
19. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
20. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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The following discussion of art's role in society requires a pre-
liminary caveat: the character of art cannot be fully glimpsed through
the lens of the Constitution. There is a devilishly strong temptation
in constitutional scholarship to treat the Constitution as the frame or
context for all social issues. Yet, the Constitution-for all its
absorbing complexity-is only a mechanism for the construction and
limitation of government. Art unquestionably has transcendent
power, but from the perspective of the Constitution, its value is solely
instrumental.21 Art and the artworld safeguard liberty by serving as a
counterweight to the government.
This Article is not intended to be a complete theory of art but
rather an account of art's instrumental function in a representative
democracy. Because the Constitution is only a plan for government,
not a prolegomenon to a comprehensive metaphysics, the phenomenon
of art and its value stretch well beyond this Article. In the final
analysis, art should not be perceived as being fully defined by the
Constitution's treatment of it.
A. Representative Democracy's Mandate for a Liberty-Reinforcing
First Amendment
The Constitution is a Janus-faced document. On the one side,
it establishes a strong central government and provides this govern-
ment broad powers to create an effective, efficient, and successful
state. On the other side, the document is steeped in the belief that
such power must be restrained for the sake of liberty.22 Thus, the
21. See MarciA. Hamilton, The First Amendment's Challenge Function and the Confusion
in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 81, 92 n.37 (1994) (criticizing
Scott Idleman's observation that "by talking about religion in terms of social utility, we not only
place logical limits on the special treatment of religion, we potentially alter the way our culture
perceives of religion generally," and noting that religion's instrumentalism, within the
constitutional scheme, simply reflects "the fact that the Constitution is a plan for government,
not for life").
22. Basic to the constitutional structure established by the Framers was their recognition
that "[tihe accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982) (quoting Federalist No. 47 (James Madison)). See Bernard
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 56 (Harvard U., 1967) (observing
that "the [Framers'] discussion of power centered on its essential characteristic of
aggressiveness: its endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate
boundaries'; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 at 559
(U.N.C., 1969) (asserting that during the convention, Federalists emphasized the "need to
distribute and separate mistrusted governmental power"); Hamilton, 29 Ga. L. Rev. at 85-90
(cited in note 21) (discussing the historical milieu from within which the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights were drafted); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting
the Fox into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
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Constitution simultaneously attempts to consolidate political power
and to subvert the overreaching exercise of that power.
The Constitution's subversive character resulted from the
Framers' threshold decision that effective and efficient government
required a representative system, not direct democracy.23 This pivotal
decision to transfer public decision making power from the governed
to the governing raised the threat of tyranny, a concern which
grounded a significant portion of the convention's debate and
produced a constitutional scheme oriented toward limiting
government.24  The original constitutional proposal limited
representative government to those powers enumerated, separated
power between mutually opposing branches, established a bicameral
legislature, divided power between the federal and state governments,
and legitimated the constitutional scheme only through a grant of
limited authority from the people.25
The necessary failure of equivalence between governed and
governing not only led the Framers to search for multiple and effec-
tive means of limiting the government's power but also led the colo-
nial citizens to protest when no bill of rights accompanied the original
Constitution.26 In response to the people's objection to the insuffi-
ciency of the constitutional plan for limiting representative govern-
Cardozo L. Rev. 357, 361 (1994) (noting that the entire constitutional scheme is "intended to...
rein in the potentially tyrannical impulses of government").
23. See generally Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L. J. 1503,
1522-24 (1990); Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of
Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 477, 527-44 (1994)
(describing James Wilson's conceptualization of representation).
24. See Geoffrey Seed, James Wilson 62, 74, 131 (KTO, 1978) (discussing Wilson's belief
that legitimate governmental authority only flowed from the people); Bailyn, The Ideological
Origins at 56 (cited in note 22). Hamilton, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 482-83, 540-44 (cited in note 23).
See also Marci A. Hamilton, Power, Responsibility, and Republican Democracy, 93 Mich. L. Rev.
1539 (1995) (reviewing David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses
the People Through Delegation (Yale U., 1993)).
25. See James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 at 616-26
(Ohio U., 1981) (providing the text of the proposed constitution); Hamilton, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at
530-34 (cited in note 23) (describing Wilson's views of popular sovereignty).
26. The absence of a bill of rights from the final draft issuing from the Constitutional
Convention resulted in "the most violent attacks on the Constitution." Charles Page Smith,
James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742-1798 at 265 (U.N.C., 1956). "[Mfost... citizens through-
out the United States [were) unconvinced that a bill of rights was not a necessary safeguard
against governmental tyranny." Seed, James Wilson at 102 (cited in note 24). See Adrienne
Koch, Madison's 'Advice to My Country" 29 (Princeton U., 1966) (stating that "the extent and
vociferousness of the demands for a bill of rights throughout the country" impressed Madison).
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ment, and to provide double insurance against governmental
overreaching, the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution.27
The function of the First Amendment is to preserve a sphere of
private liberty beyond the government's jurisdiction. Whereas the
main body of the Constitution erects functional mechanisms to keep
the government within acceptable boundaries, the First Amendment
explicitly forbids the government from manipulating certain private
spheres, such as religion, art, and philosophy. These spheres in turn
limit government by serving as counterweights to the government's
potential hegemony. Unmediated direct democracy, wherein the
governed are the governing, might not require a constitutional scheme
so focused upon limiting government or a bill of rights demarcating an
extra-governmental sphere.28 The American blend of representation
and democracy, by contrast, can be successful only to the extent that
such schemes of limitation and counterbalance succeed.
To understand the notion that the American system of repre-
sentation requires strong protection for liberty, it is important to
stress the distinction between direct democracy-a system alien to the
American experience-and representative democracy. Schemes of
majoritarian direct democracy, for example, create the possibility of
majoritarian tyranny. Every governing decision reintroduces this
27. James Madison, 2 The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the
Constitution of the United States of America 556 (Prometheus, Gaillard Hunt and James Brown
Scott eds. 1987) (remarks of Colonel Mason) (asserting that "a Bill of Rights.. . would give great
quiet to the people'.
28. By unmediated direct democracy, I do not mean the diluted forms of direct democracy
currently in existence in various states. Popular referenda and initiatives are mediated direct
democracies, which generally rely on the actions and judgments of elected officials. The citizens'
only direct participation in such public decisionmaking is through voting on prepared texts. The
people have little involvement with the content per se; others are responsible for the drafting
and distribution of the information necessary to reach an appropriate decision. See Eule, 99
Yale L. J. at 1510-12 (cited in note 23). Rather, I invoke the Athenian form of direct democracy
where all "citizens," a term that excluded women, slaves, and foreigners, were also rulers vested
with public decision making authority.
Democracy, which reached its most advanced and most active form in Athens, arose
from a series of extensions of power to a bigger and bigger class, until in the end this
included all free male citizens. It soon developed a marked character which distin-
guishes it from modern democracies in more than one way.
C.M. Bowra, The Greek Experience 73 (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1957). See A.H.M. Jones,
Athenian Democracy 46, 76 (B. Blackwell, 1957) (describing the right of every Athenian citizen,
meaning free adult males, to speak and vote in the assembly); I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates
10-11 (Little, Brown, 1988) (observing that "in democracies like Athens, where all freeborn
males were citizens, . . . [e]very citizen had the right to vote and speak in the assembly");
William Scott Ferguson, Athens: An Imperial Democracy, in Jill N. Claster, ed., Athenian
Democracy: Triumph or Travesty 11 (R.E. Krieger, 1967) (noting that "[tihere never was a
people which made the principle that all its citizens were equal a more live reality than the
Athenians made it; and no state to my knowledge was more cunningly contrived to insure the
government of the people than was theirs").
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potential problem so that the protection of minority interests becomes
the sine qua non to a constitutional scheme intent upon justice and
freedom. 29
Unlike direct democracy, anti-majoritarianism is not the sin-
gular touchstone for liberty in a representative democracy.
Representatives are independent of the voters, both majorities and
minorities, during the term of representation and decision making.30
In the American system, a majority's power is confined to choosing
representatives. Those representatives chosen are not subject to
instruction from the majority (or anyone else) on governing deci-
sions.31 Indeed, voters limit representatives during the term in only
two ways: (1) through a two-way communication process, and (2)
through the representative's desire to please his constituents for the
purpose of winning the next election.32
Representatives' decisions are constitutionally legitimate even
when they do not reflect the desires of the people. Their power can be
wielded against any group or individual regardless of their minority
or majority status. Indeed, James Madison, often credited as the
29. James Madison expressed concerns about the tyranny of the majority, which have
been translated into an American jurisprudence that focuses rather singlemindedly on majority-
minority issues. See Federalist No. 10 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers
77, 80 (Mentor, 1961) (noting that government must strive to "secure the public good and
private rights, against the danger of [the majority] faction, and at the same time to preserve the
spirit and the form of popular government"). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence
G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious
Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245 (1994); Hamilton, 29 Ga. L. Rev. at 85-91 (cited in note 21).
30. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naohed Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689,
1694 (1984) (declaring that the role of the representative is to "deliberate rather than to respond
mechanically to constituent pressures); Cass R. Sunstein, Interests Groups in American Public
Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 79 (1985) (noting that the "original constitutional framework was
based on an understanding that national representatives should be largely insulated from
constituent pressures").
31. Madison, 2 The Debates at 381 (cited in note 27) (remarks of James Wilson) ('The
people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in
the option of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings"); Robert Green McCloskey, ed., 1 The
Works of James Wilson 421 (Belknap, 1967) ("In order to enable and encourage a representative
of the publik to discharge his publik trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably
necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech').
James Wilson fervently believed that citizens should be able to express their views about
government and their representatives through direct elections. See Robert Green McCloskey,
James Wilson, in Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds., 1 The Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, 1789-1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions 88 (Chelsea House, 1969).
32. See generally Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (M.I.T., Ellen
Kennedy trans. 1985). See also George Schwab, Introduction, in Carl Schmitt, Political
Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty xi, xviii (M.I.T., George Schwab trans.
1985) ("The core exception of this authority is its exclusive possession of the right of, or its
monopoly of, political decisionmaking').
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source of the anti-majoritarianism principle, did not limit the poten-
tial evils of a representative system to minority suppression. Rather,
he recognized that representatives could oppress both the society and
minorities, stating, "It is of great importance in a republic, not only to
guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part. 33
The potential evil of representative democracy therefore is not
fully captured by reference to tyranny by the majority. Rather, the
evil to be feared is the tyranny of representatives who hold the power
to make legitimate decisions while trampling the liberty interests of
any or all of their constituents. Representative democracy makes
necessary a constitutional scheme dedicated to protecting the liberty
interests of all citizens.
In sum, the American form of representative democratic gov-
ernment is predicated on the desirability of promoting significant
counterweights to governmental authority.34 The First Amendment's
contribution to that project lies in the various ways it fosters emo-
tional, intellectual, and spiritual independence from the government.
It does so by preventing government from interfering with the
autonomous development of religion, art, politics, and family.
A common thread runs through the First Amendment's protec-
tion of religion, speech, the press, assembly, and the right to redress.
Each is essential to the central and continuing project of preserving
liberty in the face of a representative democracy. The First
Amendment enshrines the most effective means of challenging the
ever-entrenching institutionalization of a government that is inher-
33. Federalist No. 51 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 323 (cited in
note 29) (emphasis added).
34. By "counterweight" I mean private communities or associations and include under this
category religion, art, private social organizations, and families. I would distinguish Robert
Cover's more restrictive treatment of communities. Cover identifies communities as lawmaking
to make the argument that such communities interact with, affect, and define the larger
communities' notion of law. Cover, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 4 (cited in note 8). In effect, he reduces
the salient features of community-making to rationally apprehendable normativity and
lawmaking activity. By doing so, he brackets off the most interesting aspects of many power
structures, for example, those whose power is explicable through more mysterious forces such
as religion. See Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or (Princeton U., Howard V. Hong and Edna H.
Hong eds. and trans. 1987). But see Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The
Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 813
(1993) (discussing the incongruity between Cover's notion of law and lawmaking and Jewish
notions of the same). Viewing all social constructions as law-defining undermines the multitude
of ways in which communities hold and exercise power in the context of human existence, and
trivializes art's vital power in the society. Cover's concept of nomos falsifies the complexity and
mystery of human interaction and therefore fails to explain the essentially extrarational role of
art and religion in the society.
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ently separate from the people themselves. 35 This balance between
liberty and order is achieved through constructive means of subver-
sion. The First Amendment reinforces the subversive quality of the
Constitution by preventing government from suppressing the private
spheres of religion, art, and philosophy that can enrich the people's
capacity to challenge government's ideological hegemony36 The thesis
of this Article is that art, in all its forms, provides an effective and
unique means to this goal and therefore should be protected against
governmental encroachment at the highest levels of the first amend-
ment pyramid.
The First Amendment not only provides a haven for ideas but
also carves out a sphere of extrarational human empowerment. For
example, it protects a sphere of religious freedom that permits relig-
ions to maintain their vitality through protection of belief and con-
duct, protection that stretches well beyond religious ideas per se.37 A
vital religious culture, 38 as well as a thriving press and a lively politi-
cal discourse carried on through words as well as symbols, 39 are cru-
cial to this function. Similarly, art plays a critical role in unsettling
the government's hegemony by increasing the people's capacity to
35. Hamilton, 29 Ga. L. Rev. at 85-94 (cited in note 21) (examining the First Amendment's
historical development as a tool to keep government accountable to the people); Hamilton, 16
Cardozo L. Rev. at 362-64 (cited in note 22) (describing the First Amendment's role as a
limitation on Congress). Compare with Hamilton, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 482-83 (cited in note 23)
(arguing for an "attorneyship" model of representation that "capture[s] the optimal role for the
representative in a liberal republican democracy while preserving a sphere of individual self-
rule" and relying on the existence of the legislature's constitutionally limited powers and the
Bill of Rights to prevent "overzealous regulation or power grabbing by representatives" and to
erect a communication matrix between the governed and the governing). See Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 523.
36. The constriction of these private spheres, especially those involving the varieties of
human communication, was the target of the thought reform experiments conducted by the
Chinese Communist Party. See Lifton, Thought Reform at 20-30, 471 (cited in note 13); Petr
Uhl, The Alternative Community as Revolutionary Avant-Garde, in Keane, ed., The Power of the
Powerless at 188, 192 (cited in note 13) ("Alternative communities provide the soil in which is
nurtured the critical spirit that can influence the whole of society").
37. See generally Hamilton, 29 Ga. L. Rev. at 81 (cited in note 21).
38. See id. at 94 ("[Thriving religions are compatible and perhaps even necessary for
accountable government).
39. See, for example, United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (rejecting, where
the government conceded, "as it must," that flag burning constitutes expressive behavior, the
government's request to reconsider the claim that flag burning as a mode of expression does not
enjoy first amendment protection); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 410 (1989) (determining
that a state statute prohibiting flag burning violates the First Amendment because the state's
concern with protecting the flag as a symbol arose "only when a person's treatment of the flag
communicate[d] some message" and recognizing that first amendment protection "does not end
at the spoken or written word').
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question government on their own terms, rather than the govern-
ment's.
If liberty is to be certain, there are three essential if not
sufficient counterweights to representative government: religion,40
art,41 and philosophy.42 Of the three, philosophy has been privileged
by Western Enlightenment thought because of the West's faith in
reason;43 yet art and religion are also crucial to the health of a
representative democracy. I have previously argued for the least
governmental intrusion possible on religious belief and conduct.44 In
this Article, I focus upon art as a countervailing force that threatens
the status quo and checks the oppressive tendencies of representative
democracy, capacities which make art deserving of the most stringent
first amendment protection.
B. Art's Function in a Representative Democracy
Some Marxist theorists have viewed art (and religion) as sim-
ply another manifestation of the power elite's inherent tendency to
isolate and crush the lower caste.45 As discussed below, Marxist
40. See, for example, Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief- How American Law and
Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 273 (Basic Books, 1993); Tracy, The Analogical
Imagination at 11 (cited in note 3) (recognizing that religion "formulat[es] conceptions of a
general order of existence," and therefore "demands careful analysis from all those interested in
values, including those interested in 'fuller' theories of the good for the polity"); David Tracy,
Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology 14 (Seabury, 1975) (describing
Christian culture as a counterculture); Hamilton, 29 Ga. L. Rev. at 96-97 (cited in note 21).
41. See Part II.B (describing art's challenge function).
42. "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of lan-
guage." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 109, 47e (Oxford U., G.E.M.
Anscombe trans. 1953).
43. This tendency is most keenly observed in the contemporary first amendment theories
that value speech for its truth-finding capacities and its capacity to contribute to a marketplace
of rational discourse. See notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Hamilton, 54 Ohio St. L. J. at 91-96 (cited in note 8); Hamilton, 29 Ga.
L. Rev. at 133-35 (cited in note 21).
45. See Henri Arvon, Marxist Esthetics (Cornell U., Helen R. Lane trans. 1973) ("Just as
the class struggle in general has not yet ended,... so it has not yet ended on the literary front.
In the class society there is no neutral art nor can there be any such art"); Dave Laing, The
Marxist Theory of Art 11 (Harvester, 1978) ('The spectator or believer is meant to be overawed,
the work of art is a piece of establishment furniture, which makes it clear where power re-
sides'; Leon Trotsky, Proletarian Culture and Proletarian Art, in Berel Lang and Forest
Williams, eds., Marxism and Art: Writings in Aesthetics and Criticism 62 (McKay, 1972)
("Every ruling class creates its own culture, and consequently, its own art"). See also Donald F.
Brosman, Serious but not Critical, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259, 302 (1987) ("[Marxism advocates that]
political and legal representations, art, religion, and philosophy 'must be criticized in theory and
overthrown in practice' along with the economic and political structures of society on which they
rest"); Lawrence Joseph, Theories of Poetry, Theories of Law, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1223, 1231 (1993)
(quoting Michael Hamburger, The Truth of Poetry 31 (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969)) ("[Olne
[does not] need to be a Marxist to recognize that all poetry has political, social and moral impli-
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Mikhail Bakhtin's (and many other non-Marxist thinkers') insight
that art can be subversive of culture, even though it might also be its
errand boy, is closer to the mark.48 The insights of sociologist Niklas
Luhmann and literary theorist Wolfgang Iser help to illuminate art's
challenge function.47
Through the imagination, art evinces what purely didactic
speech cannot-the "sensation" of an experience never had, a world
never seen.48 Conjuring up that which has not been experienced, it
poses a challenge to the participant's preconceived and preordained
world view.49 At a level similar to empathy-a repressed emotion in
the Enlightenment's atomistic, rational mindset that permeates
constitutional theorySO-the imagination takes one beyond one's
preexisting conceptions and intuitions about life, power, and reality.
The aesthetic experience does not occur at the level of the semantic
but rather the imaginary; thus, to be conceptually available, it must
cations, regardless whether the intention behind it is didactic and 'activist' or not'); Richard M.
Thomas, Milton and Mass Culture: Toward a Postmodernist Theory of Tolerance, 62 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 525, 527 (1991) ("The more orthodox Marxist critic, Frederick Jameson, . . . views
postmodernist art... as being simply 'the cultural logic of late capitalism,' which reproduces on
the cultural level the 'reprehensible' instabilities of capitalist modes of production").
46. See Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (M.I.T., Helene Iswolsky trans. 1984).
See also notes 76-92 and accompanying text; note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the
capacity of art to confirm pre-existing values).
47. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
48. We ought not permit the meaning of the term "experience" to be confined within "the
brackets of one's own existence. The meaning of experience is a poor and haggard thing if it
refers only to what has happened to me. The meaning of education and of culture is that we live
vicariously a thousand other lives." Sittler, 1986 Christian Century at 293 (cited in note 2). Of
course, some art is didactic, or propagandistic, and that art tends to confirm existing world
views, rather than to challenge them. See Iser, The Act of Reading at 189-90 (cited in note 17).
49. Iser, The Act of Reading at 70 (cited in note 17) ('The term reality is already suspect
[when speaking of literature], for no literary text relates to contingent reality as such, but to
models or concepts of reality, in which contingencies and complexities are reduced to a
meaningful structure. We call these world-pictures or systems').
50. Liberal theory has failed to recognize the central importance of empathy in govern-
mental structures. This failure is evidenced most clearly in the writings of John Hart Ely and
other equal protection theorists (especially Lani Gulnier) and in liberalism's theories of repre-
sentation which depict the ideal representative as a mirror image of her constituents on the
ground that empathy is impossible. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 158 (Harvard
U., 1980). In these theories, difference is a necessary danger to freedom for which liberalism
offers no way out. See generally Hamilton, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 496-502 (cited in note 23).
Jfirgen Habermas most explicitly makes this mistake when he argues that the legitimacy of a
representative democracy should be tested against the paradigm of whether the addressees of a
law can be identified as its authors. See Hamilton, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 1555 (cited in note 24)
(citing Jfirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy (Typescript, William Rehg trans. 1995)).
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always be translated into the semantic.5' Art does not challenge exist-
ing reality by posing counterfactuals.52 Nor is the work of art a repre-
sentation of "concepts of reality"' 53 or a copy of reality.54 Instead, it
creates the condition for imaginatively living through a different
world altogether. Two phenomena occur simultaneously within the
participant's experience of art: (1) the recognition of preexisting
world views,55 and (2) the act of defamiliarization, the distancing of
oneself from one's assumptive world view.56 They operate together to
create a reorientation experiment, the commitment-free experiencing
of a perspective different from one's own. 57
1. World Views
'"What possible relationship do I [as a woman] have to a urinal other than to
clean it?"
55
A world view is the individual consciousness of what has been
called a "'thought collective' [which is] a community of persons mutu-
ally exchanging ideas or maintaining... interaction. 59  Thought
collectives have their own "thought styles" that encompass a "given
stock of knowledge and level of culture."60 Art conjures up the experi-
ence of foreign world views by imaginatively introducing resonating
elements from the environment, which have been neutralized or ne-
gated by the domestic social system.61 It operates to dissolve and
51. Wolfgang Iser, Prospecting: From Reader Response to Literary Anthropology 232
(Johns Hopkins U., 1989) ("[Mleaning as such is not the ultimate dimension of the literary text,
but of literary theory, whose discourse is aimed at making the text translatable into terms of
understanding').
52. Id.
53. Karel Kosik, Dialektika Konkretniho: Studieo Problematica Cloreka a Sreta 123
(Praha, 1965) (quoted in Iser, The Act of Reading at 29 (cited in note 17)).
54. Id. at 181. While Plato criticized art for its incapacity to match reality, reader re-
sponse theory celebrates art's contrast to reality.
55. See Part II.B.1.
56. See Part II.B.2.
57. See Part II.B.3.
58. Jody Kolodzy, ... But a Woman's Work is Never Done (especially on canvas), Seven
Arts 36, 39 (Nov. 1993) (quoting Rhonda Shearer's comments on Marcel Duchamp's The
Fountain).
59. Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact 39 (U. Chicago, Thaddeus
J. Trenn and Robert K. Merton eds., Thaddeus J. Trenn and Fred Bradley trans. 1979)
(emphasis omitted).
60. Id.
61. Iser, The Act of Reading at 70-72 (cited in note 17). The notion that art, politics, and
society inhabit different but overlapping spheres and that each provides contextual meaning for
the other is not uncommon. See, for example, Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands 9-21
(Granta, 1992), and Edward W. Said, Orientalism 13 (Vintage, 1979), for discussions of this
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recombine existing social meaning, which is to say reality.62 Art is not
so far removed from reality as it might make itself seem at times.63 It
can only operate within the limits of possible communication: visual
art must be seeable, music hearable, and text readable. Within those
contours, art is an agent of challenge to preexisting world views. The
system of art itself can be an environment for politics and govern-
ment.64
The most vexing problem for contemporary literary criticism
has not been the post-Enlightenment problem of escaping the
subject/object divide. 65 Theorists have persuasively accounted for the
literary experience as neither wholly textual (objective) nor wholly
experiential (subjective).66 Rather, the key problem7 has been
accounting for the possibility of change or the experience of the "new"
within the interpretive community.68 Late twentieth-century literary
criticism seems to have left us "adrift in the intertext."69 If all
concept, and I Dian Kriz, Dido Versus the Pirates: Turner's Carthaginian Paintings and the
Sublimation of Colonial Desire, 18 Oxford Art J. 116 (1995), for an example of the application of
the concept.
62. Niklas Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference 225 (Columbia U., 1990).
63. Id.
64. Murray J. Edelman, From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political
Conceptions (U. Chicago, 1995).
65. It would be true to say that the old Subjective-Objective paradox is, and always
has been, irrelevant to the arts. Clearly each and every response to a work of art is per-
sonal. However, since we live in Western Civilisation and are biologically similar, it is
equally clear that in certain circumstances one individual's reaction will very much re-
semble that of another.
Philip Hobsbaum, Theory of Criticism xiii (Indiana U., 1970).
66. One of the best among these theorists is Wolfgang Iser. See generally Iser, The Act of
Reading (cited in note 17); Iser, Prospecting (cited in note 51); Wolfgang Iser, The Implied
Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett (Johns Hopkins U.,
1974).
67. This problem is most difficult for interpretive community theorists such as Stanley
Fish who are attempting to correct the errors of objectivism and subjectivism simultaneously.
See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class: The Authority of Interpretive Communities 1-17
(Harvard U., 1980). Fish heavily criticizes Iser on the ground that Iser is trying to have it both
ways: total subjectivity coupled with complete objectivity. Stanley Fish, Why No One's Afraid of
Wolfgang Iser, 11 Diacritics 2, 12-13 (March 1981) (reviewing Iser, The Act of Reading (cited in
note 17)). Fish says there is no textual objectivity, the text means what the community says it
means (whatever the text might "say"). Id. at 9-12. Fish thus escapes what he perceives as the
greatest evil in modern literary theory-infinite relativism-but his theory does raise the
problem of infinite self-referentiality within the interpretive community. Luhmann, on whom
Iser explicitly builds his literary theory, provides a path out of that problem in his general
systems theory, discussed in notes 70-75 and accompanying text. Fish's criticism of Iser is
therefore faulty in its failure to apprehend the deep structure of Iser's thought.
68. Fish, 11 Diacritics at 9-12 (cited in note 67).
69. Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience "Recoding"
Rights-Comment on Robert H. Rotstein, ' Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the
Fiction of the Work," 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 805, 805 (1993).
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meaning is created within and governed by a self-contained
community, then how does this given experience of the "new" occur?70
And where does it come from? Intersubjectivity, intertextuality, and
deconstruction evidence the postmodern destruction of modernism's
subject/object division but leave us with a critical theory which cannot
account for the experience of the "new." If nothing is new, then time
is standing still, and all art is merely copying.
Postmodern literary theory, depicting a one-time event be-
tween reader and text, seems to deliver us into a frozen present
tense.71 The object is no longer characterized as timeless, nor is the
subject-it has been widely accepted that perspectives on each (and
therefore each themselves) are inherently transmutable-but the
relationship between the subject and the object seems to be wallowing
in a timeless morass, with no way out. The project for postmodernity
then is to bring time, or even more importantly, its marker, change,
into the phenomenological framework of communication.
Systems perpetuate themselves even when they are internally
contradictory or based on paradoxical premises. A system "cannot see
what it cannot see... [m]oreover, it cannot see that it cannot see
this."72 Furthermore, there is "negligible resonance capacity among
the subsystems of society as well as the relation of society to its envi-
ronment. ''73 Systems can be adjusted, however, via irritation from the
environment. The backgrounded environment can stimulate the sys-
tem to alter itself if the irritation produces sufficient resonance within
the system's communication structure.
Systems reduce the complexity of the data present in the envi-
ronment through ordained structures that are matrices of communi-
cation. Our limited capacity for apprehension prohibits us from oper-
ating within a system-less environment of data. Because of our radi-
cal finitude, systems by their nature tend to be closed communication
matrices that contain within them only the latent potential for
change. 74 The project of change and accommodation, or evolution, is
therefore one of identifying the means of interconnection between
70. The necessity (and difficulty) of accounting for the "new" is most acute in the system of
art, which internally defines its evolution as the continual appearance of the new. See
Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference at 191-214 (cited in note 62); Niklas Luhmann, The
Differentiation of Society 242, 355 (Columbia U., 1982).
71. The very title of Wolfgang Iser's pathbreaking work, The Act of Reading, illustrates
this point.
72. Luhmann, Ecological Communication at 23 (cited in note 18).
73. Id. at 35.
74. See generally id. at 11-23. For an illuminating discussion on autopoietic systems, and
their simultaneously closed and dynamic properties, see Jacobson, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 1649
(cited in note 10).
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systems and their multiple environments. At one level, there is fun-
damental similarity between all systems and subsystems because a
system is by definition a matrix of communication7 5 But interconnec-
tion between the system and that which is beyond the system
(whether it be another system or unsystematized data) is a question
of translation. The environment is the collection of data to which the
system has not yet attached meaning. It has the capacity to irritate a
system but only if the system has a communication structure which
will resonate in response to the irritation. Irritations continue to be
only irritations until they can be translated into the language of the
system, but the possibility of such irritation phenomenologically de-
scribes how systems change. Art is an ever-present irritant to the
social and legal system.
2. Defamiliarization
'I was walking by the Thames. Half-past morning on an autumn day. Sun in
a mist. Like an orange in a fried fish shop. 76
So begins one of the great novels in British literature. The
vagabond artist Gulley Jimson's description of the time of day and the
sun illustrates the point I make for the duration of this Section: Art
defamiliarizes 77 preexisting systems of meaning. By defamiliar-
ization, I mean the phenomenon of consciousness by which one
permits a familiar world to move to the background and
simultaneously experiences a new world. The new world is
comprehended through its difference from the familiar. For example,
one familiar experience of a forest includes the color green, leafiness,
and somewhat random positioning of the trees in nature. In contrast,
a painting could depict the trees as gray, aligned as though in
military formation, and barren. During the experience of the
painting, the familiar world of green trees is backgrounded and the
quite different world of gray trees is foregrounded. This new "forest"
challenges preconceptions of forests in general, stretching the
imagination to fit gray, military trees under the rubric "forest." The
experience teaches one to see the gray forest as different from the
75. Luhmann, Ecological Communication at 16-17 (cited in note 18).
76. Joyce Cary, The Horse's Mouth 1 (Harper, 1944).
77. See Victor Shklovsky, Art as Technique, in Paul A. Olson, ed., Russian Formalist
Criticism: Four Essays 3-24 (U. Nebraska, Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis trans. 1965).
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usual image and to see a green forest as a nonuniversal phenomenon.
Thus, the defamiliarization experience threatens conventional world
views by offering an alternative and by making the conventional
world view appear less determined.
For the ordinary observer, the sun is that star in the sky that
provides light following night, and morning is a period of hours calcu-
lated by the clock. "Half-past morning" is a phrase we simply do not
use. But as you read The Horse's Mouth and step into Gulley
Jimson's shoes, you "see" that the sun can look like an orange in a
fried fish shop and that the experience of daylight can feel like "half-
past morning." Your horizon of meaning has been revised. The sun
and the daily experience of time have been defamiliarized. Art's in-
strumental, first amendment value lies in its capacity to bring to the
foreground some aspect of the environment's complexity that, within
the autopoietic system of meaning, had been excluded and to compare
the foregrounded material against the reader's previously held, but
now backgrounded, original world view.
Defamiliarization is the capacity for a work to reveal new per-
spectives.78 Art does not elegantly simplify our world views for merely
one moment of aesthetic bliss but rather turns us away from one
reality to another. Drawing upon this insight, twentieth-century
reader response theory has detailed how defamiliarization occurs for
the reader of the literary text. In order to be systems at all, systems
necessarily exclude certain possibilities latent in the environment.
"[L]iterature supplies those possibilities which have been excluded by
the prevalent system [and] endeavors to counter the problems
produced by the system," doing so through what Iser has labelled the
"literary repertoires. ' '79
The act of reading is composed of two competing and interact-
ing repertoires, that of the text and that of the reader. A reader
brings to the reading experience a set of closed world views. The text
brings to the experience a tension between the world view it takes as
given (in other words, that which it backgrounds) and the world view
it suggests in contrast (or foregrounds). 8° "The contemporary reader
will find himself confronted with familiar conventions in an unfamil-
iar light, and, indeed, this is the situation that causes him to become
78. See generally id.
79. Iser, The Act of Reading at 73 (cited in note 17).
80. Id. at 94 ("In the literary text, not only is the background unformulated and variable,
but its significance will also change in accordance with the new perspectives brought about by
the foregrounded elements; the familiar facilitates our comprehension of the unfamiliar, but the
unfamiliar in turn restructures our comprehension of the familiar).
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involved in the process of building up the meaning of the work.81 As
that project proceeds, the reader backgrounds her preexisting world
view as she experiences a world view presented by the text.82 There is
no transportation of the reader away from her preexisting world
views, rather they remain the meaningful backdrop against which
this new experience unfolds.83 "Those elements of the [text's] reper-
toire which are familiar to the reader through their application in
real-life situations, lose their validity when transplanted into the
literary text. And it is precisely this loss of validity which leads to the
communication of something new."84 The function of the text then is
to permit the reader to examine "familiar reality with new eyes. 85
The experience of the new, which is part and parcel of the
reader's capacity to background his preexisting world view, is made
possible by the ever-latent negativity of the text.
[Niegativity is the structure underlying the invalidation of the manifested
reality. It is... the nonformulation of the not-yet-comprehended, it does no
more than mark out a relationship to that which it disputes, and so it provides
a basic link between the reader and the text. If the reader is made to formu-
late the cause underlying the questioning of the world, it implies that he must
transcend that world, in order to be able to observe it from outside. And herein
lies the true communicatory function of literature.8 6
The phenomenon of defamiliarization does not necessarily
undermine the reader's world views but rather creates the possibility
for challenge. The encounter may also result in reaffirmation of
preexisting world views.87 Whatever conceptual evaluation follows the
encounter between reader and text, however, "the same [initial]
81. Id. at 78.
82. There is no one world view evinced by the work. The genius of Iser's approach lies in
its capacity to explain multiple interpretive variations while rejecting the notion of an infinity of
subjective, relativistic interpretations. See id. at 85 (arguing that access is not arbitrary).
83. Id. at 80 ("[Tlhe fact that an old context is replaced by a new one does not mean that it
disappears altogether. Instead, it is transformed into a virtual background against which the
new subject matter can stand out in clear relief').
84. Id. at 83.
85. Id. at 181.
86. Id. at 229-30. See also David Bleich, Intersubjective Reading, 17 New Lit. Hist. 401
(1986).
87. Because the two repertoires may overlap to varying degrees, different types of litera-
ture introduce the "new" to varying degrees. "[R]hetorical, didactic, and propagandist literature
will generally take over intact the thought system already familiar to its readers .... This
observation holds good for medieval mystery plays right through to present-day socialist real-
ism. What such texts set out to communicate is a confirmation of values already known to the
public." Isser, The Act of Reading at 83 (cited in note 17).
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balancing function" occurs.8 8 Tension between the text and the reader
is experienced as disorientation, which demands a fresh
interpretation or a retreat to reaffirmation of the status quo.
The variety of artforms have this defamiliarizing potential,
from literature to visual art to music. 89 Modern visual art has taken
its challenge function with respect to one particular world view very
seriously. Its project has been to challenge the concept of art itself.90
The examples are obvious and well known: Duchamp, Warhol, and
Lichtenstein, among others. They have incorporated the mundane
into their works, backgrounding the history of aesthetics as they
foregrounded an object previously perceived as solely utilitarian or
pop.9 1
The defamiliarizing capacity of a particular work of art is pro-
portional to the particular reader's store of the familiar. For the art
critic, Duchamp's The Fountain challenges preexisting and antique
notions of the definition of art and the permissible content of art.
Other world views can also be brought to bear on The Fountain.
Some, in fact, would indicate that there are times (probably many)
when the intended challenge function of a particular work misses the
mark. As the quote at the beginning of the preceding section
intimated, a woman may take a rather different view of The Fountain
than a man for the very reason that the urinal intimately familiar to
the man, and therefore a strong candidate for ironic defamiliarization,
while it is simply another porcelain object to be cleaned to the woman
and, therefore, the force of The Fountain's challenge to prevailing
aesthetic values may fall flat. In other words, how the work resonates
with some aspect of the participant's preexisting world view shapes
the contours of the reorientation experiment.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 227-28. See also Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking 40 (Hackett,
1978).
90. Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism 267-69
(Harcourt, Brace, 2d ed. 1981).
91. The tension set up between background and foreground is intensely self-referential
within the art world's system of communication, creating a tendency to think that art itself has
been relegated to a system that is open only to elites and insiders. See Luhmann, Essays on
Self-Reference at ch.11 (cited in note 62). That, in my view, however, is an inductive error. The
fact that modern art has posed questions to the definition of art itself and that challenge has
had little relevance to the world views of the larger public does not argue against the power of
art to challenge other existing world views. It mistakenly identifies art's capacity to challenge a
particular target (what art means within the community of the art elite) for the full range of
art's challenge capacities. This focus is wrong. Rather than focus upon the fashionable and
contemporary target of some art, we should focus on art's inherent capacity to drive a wedge
into an otherwise closed system, namely its challenge function.
[Vol. 49:73
ART SPEECH
In sum, the experience of art is one of disorientation and defa-
miliarization. It is a clash between the given and the not-yet-incorpo-
rated. By decontextualizing the already-given, it creates the possibil-
ity for critique and change of existing world views. And it does so
without forcing the reader through a factual experience of the chal-
lenging world view. It is a marvelous time, energy, and resource
economizer: "Art, especially literature, is a great hall of reflection
where we can all meet and everything under the sun can be examined
and considered. For this reason it is feared and attacked by dictators,
and by authoritarian moralists."92
3. The Ongoing Reorientation Experiment
"[A] work of art ... makes it appear to us for the time that we have lived an-
other life-that we have had a miraculous enlargement of experience. 93
Through defamiliarization, the participant has the opportunity
to engage in a reorientation experiment. Ironically, the post-
Enlightenment tendency to trivialize the importance of art is evident
in aesthetic theory. There is an unstated presumption that all one
will derive from a work of art is what one perceives in the presence of
the work. Iser seems to be guilty of this fault in his concentrated
focus on the "act of reading," as are most other theorists who attempt
to describe the experience of art.94  Henry James himself, who
succinctly described the experience of art in the quote above, fell into
the trap of limiting the experience to "the time" of reading the work.
Missing from these descriptions of aesthetic experience is the
phenomenon of memory.
The experience of art is not complete following factual percep-
tion of it, whether it was seen, heard, or felt. The defamiliarization
effect of the work may occur simultaneously with one's factual percep-
tion, or it may be stored and triggered later. In other words, its de-
familiarization capacity can remain latent.
This universal aspect of art is illustrated by the following hy-
pothetical. One could read Sinclair Lewis's novel, Babbitt,95 as a
teenager and be ill-prepared to respond to its vision. The book's de-
92. Iris Murdoch, The Fire & the Sun 86 (Clarendon, 1977).
93. James E. Miller, Jr., ed., Theory of Fiction: Henry James 93 (U. Nebraska, 1972).
94. Beardsley, Aesthetics at 44 (cited in note 90).
95. Sinclair Lewis, Babbitt (Harcourt Brace, 1922).
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scription of a middle-aged company man enslaved by society's rules
may be absorbing, but not particularly relevant, to the limited experi-
ence of a teenager. Babbitt's ethical choices are not therefore provoca-
tive. Twenty years later, laden with pressing responsibilities and
attempting to live a virtuous life, while becoming increasingly aware
of the difficulty of both living such a life and knowing whether one is
doing so, that same person might find herself (without returning to
the book) reliving the experience of the book. Now she sees the ten-
sion in the book; she sees that Babbitt's dilemmas were difficult and
that the novel's judgment of him was perhaps harsh but right. As a
sixteen-year-old, it would have been easy to finish the book and tell
oneself that one should not live Babbitt's life. But that conclusion
reflects the conviction of an individual whose virtue has been untried.
A teenager's world view makes it impossible for Babbitt to initiate a
reorientation experiment. In short, the teenager lacks the familiar to
be defamiliarized. Once one has earned familiarity with the world
view being challenged by Babbitt, however, Babbitt's defamiliarization
potential is realized. The thirty-five-year-old can experience the book
(without rereading it) as a newly opened world that challenges the
newly created status quo.
The value of art lies not merely in its contemporaneous experi-
ence, but also in its capacity to be a future, potent, immanent tool of
critique. A store of such experiences is invaluable against the be-
witchment of one's common sense by the potent and prevailing powers
in society, including those of the government.
III. EXAMPLES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ART AND
GOVERNMENT
History is replete with examples where art threatened
entrenched power structures and in so doing secured a measure of
freedom. Although the many examples are too numerous to catalogue
here, it is worthwhile to provide a handful of illustrative examples to
make my art speech thesis more clear.
In modern times, novels have defamiliarized generations from
a variety of social conditions. A striking instance is Abraham
Lincoln's famous comment to Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of Uncle
Tom's Cabin, who upon meeting her said in all seriousness, "So this is
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the little lady who made this big war."96 Uncle Tom's Cabin was an
incendiary work in its time. Its power to subvert the prevailing
status quo is evidenced by the strong reaction to it. Schools in the
North and the South prohibited students from reading the book and
some even required students to pledge never to read it. 7 Its world
view was so starkly removed from the familiar that neither side of the
Civil War found it palatable, even fifty years after its publication.98
During the Victorian era, numerous authors wrote creative works
that brought to light government-sanctioned, dismal social and
working conditions.9 9  The worlds these novels evoked were
instrumental in expediting social critique and change.100 In
contemporary times, Salman Rushdie's novel, The Satanic Verses,
undermined the accepted orthodoxy of the Islamic culture and was
met by the Iranian government's call for his assassination.101
Turning to the world of music, where original works typically
transport the hearer away from prevailing reality, rock and roll music
and the culture surrounding it regularly defamiliarize accepted status
quo presuppositions. 0 2 Indeed, rock music has initiated a subversive
dialectic on culture which has turned back upon itself.0 3 Finally,
visual art since Impressionism has been one era after another that
reorients the view's perspective, prompting dictatorial ideologues such
as Hitler and Stalin to destroy and suppress the new.
Yet even that art which does not foment a revolution and is not
directly aimed at the government accomplishes the end of enlarging
the sphere of liberty. Recent communist and totalitarian regimes
provide a vivid and practical context that emphasizes the utility of
art. Along with religion and philosophy, art is a hedge against
ideological totalism.' °4  A multiplicity of world views and the
96. Edmund Wilson, Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War 3
(Oxford U., 1962).
97. Id. at 4-5.
98. Id.
99. See, for example, Christopher Hampton, ed., A Radical Reader: The Struggle for
Change in England, 1381-1914 at 454-546 (Penguin, 1984).
100. See Kate Flint, ed., The Victorian Novelist: Social Problems and Social Change 7
(Croom Helm, 1987) (explaining how these novelists' rhetorical choices were chosen "to publicise
dreadful social conditions, and, beyond this, to stimulate a belief in the need for action").
101. Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (Consortium, 1989).
102. See generally Linda Martin and Kerry Segrave, Anti-Rock: The Opposition to Rock 'n'
Roll (Anchor Books, 1988); any issue of Wired Magazine.
103. See Martin and Segrave, Anti-Rock at chs.12, 15, 28 (cited in note 102).
104. When power leads man toward arrogance, poetry reminds him of his limitations.
When power narrows the areas of man's concerns, poetry reminds him of the richness
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individual's capacity to test differing views threaten the totalitarian
state's basic tenet: unanimity of viewpoint through the atrophy of the
individual qua individual. 10 5  The totalitarian state pursues citizen
control through either voluntary or forced repressive measures,
overtly treating citizen independence as a menace to the status quo
and its ruling authority.106 In particular, governmental arts funding
and diversity of his experience. When power corrupts, poetry cleanses, for art estab-
lishes the basic human truths which must serve as the touchstones of our judgment.
Charles Champlin, The Blessings of Liberty, L.A. Times F1 (Dec. 28, 1989) (discussing the
artists' role in the downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe). See John Russell, Tyrants Fall;
Art Endures, N.Y. Times § 2 at 1 (Feb. 18, 1990) (concluding that "[i]n the face of fragmentation
and alienation [art] restores our identity, reactivates our memory and gives us precisely the
reorientation that we sometimes need," whereas "it is the function of the tyrant to destroy
memory, black out identity, and obliterate the alternative"). See generally Harvey M.
Weinstein, Psychiatry and the CIA- Victims of Mind Control (American Psychiatric, 1990);
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment 15-16 (Ohio St., 1965) ('CThe doctrine
that criticism of government officials and policy may be viewed as defamation . . . [and]
punished as a serious crime... is found as the hallmark of all closed societies throughout the
world .... [Tihe absence of seditious libel as a crime is the true pragmatic test of freedom of
speech").
105. Edgar H. Schein, Inge Schneier and Curtis H. Barker, Coercive Persuasion. A Socio-
psychological Analysis of the 'Brainwashing" of American Civilian Prisoners by the Chinese
Communists 55 (W.W. Norton, 1961). See Theodore H.E. Chen, Thought Reform of the Chinese
Intellectuals 79 (Hong Kong U., 1960) (stating that "[i]ndividualism is ... a central target of
[totalism's] attack.... [Tihe replacement of individualism by collectivism means in the last
analysis the total surrender of the individual to the Party and the state. Once this has been
accomplished, thought reform will have been complete"); Schein, Schneier and Barker, Coercive
Persuasion at 61 (outlining the "avowed and implicit aims of thought reform" as creating a new
man, changing attitudes, producing obedient and energetic party workers, initiating individuals
not yet committed ideologically into Communist society, and producing ideological unanimity);
Uhl, The Alternative Community, in Keane, ed., The Power of the Powerless at 192 (cited in note
13) (observing that in Stalin-like bureaucratic dictatorships "any form of expression that is not
under bureaucratic control is necessarily disruptive. Every independent act, both individual
and, even more, collective, consequently provokes conflict with bureaucratic power, regardless of
whether it is deliberately aimed against the system or whether it merely desires to exist...
without provoking conflicts"). See generally F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (U. Chicago,
1944) (stressing the importance of the concept of individualism to freedom); M. Stanton Evans,
The Theme Is Freedom: Religion, Politics, and the American Tradition (Regnery, 1994) (same).
106. Janusz Bugajski and Maxine Pollack, East European Fault Lines: Dissent, Opposition,
and Social Activism 48 (Westview, 1989) (arguing that a challenge to communism's overriding
objective of silencing critics provokes repressive measures from party elite because the
party/state apparatus's survival depends on "stifling dissent and maintaining the status quo').
The political indoctrination of an ideologically totalist state can result in not only political
uniformity but also thoroughgoing conformity at many levels. One China observer stated in
1961 that:
Almost everyone who has had contact with Communist China in recent years has been
struck by the degree to which all the citizens look alike, speak alike, and act
alike.... In fact, many observers feel somewhat terrified by this massive conformity
because it implies a tremendous power potential and has a strong appeal for anyone
seeking to lose himself in a powerful cause.
Schein, Schneier and Barker, Coercive Persuasion at 56 (cited in note 105). See id. at 57
(observing that "the Communists have clearly come to rely increasingly on repression and
control and decreasingly on voluntary support" until the Cultural Revolution (citation omitted)).
See also Chen, Thought Reform at 77 (cited in note 105) (describing methods of indirect coercion
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has been used to redirect the market toward the status quo. No
historical example makes the point more clearly than the Cultural
Revolution in China where the price for extensive governmental
involvement in arts education and creation has been conformity and
mediocrity of artistic works. 10 7
Because of its destabilizing character, art traditionally has
been the target of totalitarian governments. For example, the
"thought reform" or "persuasion" experiments in China attempted to
eradicate a panoply of art forms,os the governments of Eastern
Europe suppressed and marginalized art and artists,19 and Nazi
Germany censored all art that would not assist Hitler's ideological
goals.110 Apropros, the Czech Charter of 1977, the manifesto of the
of a political message). The Cultural Revolution, with its subtler means of suppression led to
the same result: "the voices of dissidence [were] effectively stilled, and the People's Republic...
reverted once again to being a culturally two-dimensional society, a flatland of the mind."
Steven W. Mosher, Broken Earth: The Rural Chinese 288 (Free Press, 1983).
107. See Fox Butterfield, China: Alive in the Bitter Sea 436 (Times Books, 1982).
108. All information from the West is censored and all unorthodox ideas are excluded
from the carefully co-ordinated complex of media (e.g., the newspapers, the movies, the
radio, loudspeakers in public places, dramatic productions, cartoons, comics, magazines,
books, pamphlets, painting, poster art, dances and songs, operas, and village storytell-
ers).
Schein, Schneier and Barker, Coercive Persuasion at 46 (cited in note 105). See also Chen,
Thought Reform at 78-79 (cited in note 105) (discussing the "Communist disdain of book
knowledge or what they consider to be theory unrelated to action'.
109. See Jiri Ruml, Who Really Is Isolated, in Keane, ed., The Power of the Powerless at 181
(cited in note 13) (stating that the Czech reform movement was peopled by "actors banned from
acting, singers and musicians condemned to silence,... writers and academics forbidden to
publish.... [and] artists with no opportunity to exhibit," among others).
110. Geoffrey Hartman has mourned the fact that art was capable of being used to Hitler's
monstrous ends. See Geoffrey H. Hartman, Is an Aesthetic Ethos Possible? Night Thoughts
After Auschwitz, 6 Cardozo L. & Lit. 135, 135-37 (1994). Its capacity for '"deological perversion,"
leads him to question whether art has any saving capacity. Id. at 151. He has confused art with
art censorship. Hitler's ideological success is as attributable to the art he suppressed as it is to
the art he trumpeted. Censorship of all art except that which serves particular ideological goals
is tyranny. Artistic freedom, however, is a force for liberty.
Nazi Germany exercised control over the distribution of art in order to control the emotions
of the people. Eric Gibson, Abstract Art's 'Elitist' Tag a Misnomer, Wash. Times D2 (June 21,
1992) (noting that many modernists view their art as a means of communication, not the
"insidious agent of social division and control those who label it elitist think it is," and warning
that such elitist rhetoric was used in Nazi Germany to criticize modern art and "mandate an
official, realistic style [making] art an instrument of government propaganda"); Eric Gibson,
Frohnmayer Paints Critics as Bunch of Neo-Nazis, Wash. Times El (Mar. 27, 1992) (quoting
John Frohnmayer as recognizing the Nazis' "wide cultural war," and as "be[ing chilled to the
bone with the similarities between even the language that was used in the words of Hitler and
Goebbels to what is being used in the political discourse [in the controversy over NEA funding of
controversial art]'). See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified on other
grounds, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742 (1969);
Ian Dunlop, The Shock of the New 224-59 (American Heritage, 1972) (describing the Nazis'
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Czech reform movement, identified the evils of the Czech government
as follows:
Freedom of public expression is inhibited by the centralized control of all the
communication media and of publishing and cultural institutions. No philo-
sophical, political or scientific view or artistic activity that departs ever so
slightly from the narrow bounds of official ideology or aesthetics is allowed to
be published... no open debate is allowed in the domain of thought and art."'
For decades, the citizens of Eastern Europe lived under op-
pressive governmental (and political party) structures. Yet, they
successfully rose up against these extraordinarily powerful forces." 2
confiscation of hundreds of modern masterpieces, including works by Picasso, Chagall, and
Gaugin, and displaying them in an "Exhibition of Degenerate Art").
The Nazi Entartete Kunst (Exhibition of Degenerate Art) that was first displayed in 1937,
was recently reproduced and toured the United States in 1991. The literal translation of entar-
tete suggests "biology, natural growth, a natural species gone so far off its genetic course as to be
virtually unrecognisable-a perverse mutation." Matthew Collings, Resistance Heroes of Art,
Guardian 38 (May 20, 1992). "Part of the purpose of Entartete Kunst was to undermine the
authority not just of well-known artists but of the existing institutions of art." Id.
What has to be remembered in all this is that racism and anti-Semitism were not just
an outgrowth or a byproduct of Nazism but its basis. What drew the millions to
Entartete Kunst was the revelation in a highly compressed, spectacularised form of a
certain negative ideal. The Nazis claimed that... [what] brought the Jews to Germany
as well as intellectuals, homosexuality, whores, pacifism, communism, inflation and ne-
gro jazz music, were clearly figured in the distortions, disharmony and unnatural col-
ours of modern art.
Just as degenerate art could be weeded out and eventually destroyed-to be re-
placed by good, pure art by German artists approved by Hitler-so could degenerate
elements of society be combed out of the body of the German volk.
Id.
111. Keane, ed., The Power of the Powerless at app.218 (cited in note 13).
112. See, for example, Colin McIntyre, Half a Million East Germans March for Democracy,
Reuter News Service (Nov. 13, 1989); Charles T. Powers, Commitment of Youth Key to East
Europe Upheaval, L.A. Times Al (Jan. 21, 1990); Mark Trevelyan, Walesa Ready to Claim Prize
of Polish Presidency, Reuter News Service (April 11, 1990) (noting Walesa's role in "steering
Solidarity to power.., a triumph that ended more than four decades of Communist rule").
During the historic fail of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, the U.S. government and many
of its citizens in their professional capacities felt the need to share the American democratic
experience and even to provide prescriptive advice. See Joan Davison, America's Impact on
Constitutional Change in Eastern Europe, 55 Albany L. Rev. 793, 793 (1992) (noting the silent
impact of the "oldest working constitution" on the Eastern European constitutional
development, and the advice and assistance provided by U.S. governmental and nongov-
ernmental consultants in this process); A.E. Dick Howard, How Ideas Travel: The Bill of Rights
at Home and Abroad, 63 N.Y. St. B. J. 6, 6-7 (1991) (observing that "[tiraffic is heavy between
the United States and the emerging democracies," with those Americans who consult on
Eastern European constitutions dubbed "constitutional Johnny Appleseeds"); Howard A. Wolf-
Rodda, Note, The Support for Eastern European Democracy Act of 1989: A Description and
Assessment of Its Responsiveness to the Needs of Poland, 17 Md. J. Intl. L. & Trade 107, 107-08
(1993) (discussing American programs in Eastern Europe aimed primarily at currency stabiliza-
tion, development of private entities, and technical support for economic and political conver-
sion). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 Cardozo L. Rev.
907 (1993) (advising Eastern European governments on drafting constitutions). No doubt this
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Many factors came into play in the fall of the Iron Curtain including a
growing desire for consumer goods." 3 Although organized religion
and world pressure played significant roles in facilitating the people's
overthrow of their governments,11 4 art's societal force clearly assisted
the people of Eastern Europe to see beyond the oppression in their
daily lives, providing perspective, hope, and a foundation for
change. 15 Art is a weapon against the prevailing context, whether it
be war," 6 oppression, or an ingrained status quo.
country has much to teach on this score, but we can also learn plenty from the failure of
socialism and communism in Eastern Europe.
113. Gale Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern
Europe Since 1945 at 182-83 (Oxford U., 1991) (observing Gorbachev's realization that "despite
its military strength the Soviet Union is in many ways a Third World country, unable to provide
its citizens with what other Europeans consider the basic necessities of modern life," and noting
that "1lowered standards of living... and shortages [in Eastern Europe] increased unrest and
made the necessity for reforms more and more obvious").
114. The influence of world pressure in the ultimate overthrow of Eastern Europe's com-
munist regimes was evidenced in 1973 when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe convened in Helsinki, and subsequently produced the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.
William M. Brinton, The Helsinki Final Act and Other Covenants, in William M. Brinton and
Alan Rinzler, eds., Without Force or Lies 471, 474-75 (Mercury House, 1990). "In return for the
acceptance of postwar European borders, the Western powers at the conference demanded the
addition of a series of clauses to the Final Act that guaranteed certain human rights." Stokes,
ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism at 156 (cited in note 113). These fundamental freedoms in-
cluded the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as liberty to exercise civil and
political rights. Brinton, The Helsinki Final Act, in Brinton and Rinzler, eds., Without Force or
Lies at 475. See The Helsinki Accords, in Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism at 160-62
(cited in note 113). To enforce these human rights provisions, Helsinki Watch groups formed,
and in Poland, the Catholic Church formed a similar organization. Id. at 156. The Charter 77
Declaration, signed by V6clav Havel and numerous other Czechoslovakian writers, welcomed
the Czech government's accession to the Helsinki Final Act, but observed that its existence
"serves as an urgent reminder of the extent to which basic human rights in our country exist,
regrettably, on paper only." Id. at 163. "It was the lip service paid to these solemn covenants
that finally led to the revolution from below." Brinton, The Helsinki Final Act, in Brinton and
Rinzler, eds., Without Force or Lies at 476. See Craig R. Whitney, David Binder and Serge
Schmemann, The Opening of the Berlin Wall, in Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism at
255, 256 (cited in note 113) (recognizing Hungary's momentous decision to allow 6migrds to go to
the West as a declaration that "international covenants on human rights were more important
than treaties with other Warsaw Pact nations").
Additionally, "(tihe battle to preserve the morals and morale of traditional religious groups
did ... inspire resistance." Bugajski and Pollack, East European Fault Lines at 143 (cited in
note 106). See also id. at 142-176 (discussing the organizational initiatives of organized
religious hierarchies and the independent social drives of religious activists); Joni Lovenduski
and Jean Woodall, Politics and Society in Eastern Europe 335-340 (MacMillan, 1987) (describing
the German and Polish churches' ability to defend "a more widely defined political interest);
Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism at 193 (cited in note 113) (observing the "significant
role [the Catholic Church played] in the battle against secular totalitarianism).
115. See Shermakaye Bass, A Man of Art and Letters, Dallas Morn. News 1C (Jan. 31,
1995) (quoting mail artist John Held, Jr.'s observation that "mail is the way people in Eastern
Europe were finding out about Western culture and art in the '60s, '70s and '80s... [and] it was
through the hope people got through mail art contacts that [communism] toppled"); Champlin,
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ART'S CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTION
Art is a countervailing force. Because of its threat to the
status quo, the government has an almost irresistible urge to meddle
with it. Whether the government is funding, distributing, or
suppressing artworks, there should be a presumption that such
meddling is unconstitutional. The government can overcome this
presumption only if its regulation passes the strict scrutiny now
applied to political speech.1 7 In other words, any regulation of art
should be unconstitutional unless the government can prove a
compelling interest in such regulation and it can show the regulation
directly advances such an interest. Under this view, the Supreme
Court's doctrine should be highly protective of art; governmental
funding of new art becomes as troubling as its regulation of political
speech, warranting skepticism and the highest level of scrutiny; and
arts education becomes crucial for the health of a representative
democracy.
The case is yet to be made for the compelling interest in arts
funding. Time has proven that such funding has a natural tendency
to become politicized and therefore unconstitutional. In contrast, arts
education in the public schools is a compelling interest in a represen-
tative democracy, and decisions to suppress certain works in the
schools require careful scrutiny.
A. The Treatment of Art in American Jurisprudence
The legal world has been slow to understand and articulate
how art can assist the people to analyze and criticize authority,
particularly the government's. If the First Amendment stands for
L.A. Times at F1 (cited in note 104) (observing the significant role of artists in the fall of
communism, and comparing the role of Eastern European writers with that "played by Tom
Paine and the other firebrands of freedom in the American Colonies immediately after 1776");
Robin Knight, Forever Winter in Prague, U.S. News & World Rep. 30, 30 (Aug. 8, 1988) (finding
a glimmer of hope in Czechoslovakia in 1988, with signs of renewed religious and cultural
activism, including a wider range of films, plays, and independent art shows that demonstrated
the "first stirrings of public consciousness in 20 years" and that "elicited a curiously muted
response from the authorities"); Russell, N.Y. Times § 2 at 1 (cited in note 104) (citing specific
instances of how "the novelist, the playwright, the poet, the composer, the movie maker, and
sometimes the painter or sculptor have been chipping away ever since the end of World War II
at the monolithic political structure").
116. Maralyn Lois Polak, War Games: Interview of Suada Kapic, Phila. Inq. Mag. 7, 7 (July
17, 1994) (discussing how art has been a "weapon of survivar' in the midst of war).
117. See, for example, Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992); United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 477 U.S. 456, 462 (1980).
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anything, the government cannot regulate speech simply because it
finds a medium of expression threatening to its ideology.
1. The Error of Protecting Art Only for Ideas' Sake
There is a plethora of political theories explaining or justifying
speech's general importance in a democracy, usually by treating
speech as a vehicle for rationally apprehended ideas. Differences in
approach are attributable to different values regarding the proper
ends of a system for generating ideas.118 Granted, proponents of these
theories have been inclined to include art under the category of pro-
tected speech,11 9 but they have not addressed, much less reconciled,
118. The competing ends range from a marketplace of ideas, truth, self-fulfillment, venting
and self-government. See generally Lee Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech
and Extremist Speech in America (Oxford U., 1986) (discussing the limits of traditional theo-
ries); Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (Random House, 1970)
(approving a first amendment system that ensures individual self-fulfillment and stability in the
community); id. at 17 ('The root purpose of the First Amendment is to assure an effective
system of freedom of expression in a democratic society"); Nat Hentoff, The First Freedom: The
Tumultuous History of Free Speech in America (Delacorte, 1980) (discussing the freedom of
speech doctrine vis-i-vis self-governance); Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The
Constitutional Powers of the People (Oxford U., 1960) (proposing a self-governance theory);
Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis (Michie, 1984) (arguing for a first
amendment scheme that fosters self-realization); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A
Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge U., 1982) (discussing traditional theories explaining free
speech); Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance 5 (Harvard U.,
1990) ("If the first amendment is to have an organizing symbol ... let it be the image of the
dissenter"); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L. J.
877 (1963) (canvassing various first amendment theories); R.H. Coase, The Economics of the
First Amendment: The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. 384, 384-
86 (May 1974) (characterizing the freedoms contemplated by the First Amendment as a "market
for ideas").
119. See, for example, William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1965) (noting that "literature and
the arts... fall within the subjects of 'governing importance' that the first amendment abso-
lutely protects from abridgment"); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute,
1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245.
Dr. Meiklejohn addressed the issue as follows:
[T]here are many forms of thought and expression within the range of human communi-
cations from which the voter derives the knowledge... a ballot should express.
[For example, literature and the arts must be protected by the First Amendment.
They lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation and response to the val-
ues out of which the riches of the general welfare are created.
Id. at 256-57. See also Owen M. Fiss, Freedom and Feminism, 80 Georgetown L. J. 2041, 2057
(1992) ("[Slpeech that specifically addresses some question of government policy has an
immediate and direct claim to protection under [the self-governance] theory of free speech. But
art and literature, even that which makes no mention of politics and government affairs, is...
protected"); Christopher Pesce, The Likeness Monster: Should the Right of Publicity Protect
Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 782, 786 n.30 (1990) ('The First Amendment protects
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the difficulty of explaining how a first amendment theory valuing
speech for its rationally comprehensible ideas can comfortably ac-
commodate the phenomenon of art. 20 Such a reconciliation is not
possible. Art's value in the First Amendment's antityranny scheme is
incompletely explained by a system that values speech only for its
conceptual content.121
Although the Supreme Court has recognized, since at least
1952, that art should receive some first amendment protection, 122 it
works of art as a form of speech"); Hentoff, The First Freedom at 297-313 (cited in note 118)
(alluding to the protection of art within his discussion of unprotected work, namely, obscenity in
books, movies, and magazines); Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in
America 18-19 (Harper & Row, 1988) (citing cases that recognize first amendment protection of
art as raising "speech issues" without reference to the artistic nature of the "speech" at issue).
Evidence of art's low status in the first amendment galaxy is the fact that no constitutional
text has a chapter or subchapter devoted to art. See, for example, Edward L. Barrett, Jr.,
William Cohen and Jonathan D. Varat, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials (Foundation,
8th ed. 1989); Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law (Foundation, 12th ed. 1991); Steven H.
Shiffrin and Jesse H. Choper, First Amendment: Cases, Comments, Questions (West, 1991);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein and Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional
Law (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1991); William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment (Foundation,
1991); Ronald D. Rotunda, John E. Nowak and J. Nelson Young, 3 Treatise on Constitutional
Law: Substance and Procedure (West, 1986); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
(Foundation, 2d ed. 1988). See also John H. Garvey and Frederick Schauer, The First
Amendment: A Reader (West, 1992).
120. See William Marshall, Free Speech and the "Problem" of Democracy, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev.
191, 199-200 (1994) (reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech
(Free Press, 1993)) (criticizing Sunstein's argument for protecting artistic speech only to the
extent of its political content). But see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 15-16 (stating that artistic communication is not relevant to the
political process and is therefore undeserving of first amendment protection under traditional
rationales); Kim M. Shipley, Comment, The Politicization of Art: the National Endowment for
the Arts, the First Amendment, and Senator Helms, 40 Emory L. J. 241, 258, 263, 265 (1991)
(reducing art to its didactic content, "information").
121. Nahmod, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. at 222-23, 262-63 (cited in note 7) (attributing art's "second
class status" in the Court's first amendment jurisprudence to the "centrality of political expres-
sion in theories of the first amendment," and noting that the marketplace of ideas theory fails to
properly "account for the noncognitive aspects of artistic expression"); Miller, 904 F.2d at 1093
(Posner, J., concurring) (stating that if the First Amendment only protected ideas, most art
would be unprotected).
122. Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952). See generally Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) ("[Olur cases have never suggested that expression
about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters ... is not entitled to
full First Amendment protection"); Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58
(1975) (noting that live drama is not unprotected by the First Amendment and should not be
held to a "drastically different standard" than other forms of expression); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1973) ("[Un the area of freedom of speech ... the courts must always remain
sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
expression"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("Wholly neutral futilities . . . come
under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons" (citation
omitted)); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968) (citing Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 495)
("Motion pictures are, of course, protected by the First Amendment). See Note, Standards for
Federal Funding of the Arts: Free Expression and Political Control, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1969,
1980 & nn.58-59 (1990) ("An examination of first amendment doctrine strongly suggests that
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has yet to provide a theory to undergird the assertion, or to make
clear how much protection art ought to receive. Mirroring the com-
mentators' approach, the Court tends to protect art only to the extent
that it is a vehicle for ideas, especially political ideas.123 This ap-
proach was summarized succinctly in a recent case. In Bery v. City of
New York,124 artists who sell their original works on public sidewalks
challenged a city ordinance that requires street vendors to have li-
censes and excludes newspaper vendors from its coverage. Because
there are a limited number of licenses, artists challenged the ordi-
works of art are presumptively protected speech"). But see Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115,
119-20 (1973) (commenting that "pictures, film, paintings, drawings, and engravings ... have
First Amendment protection until they collide with the long-settled position ... that obscenity is
not protected by the Constitution"). See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on
Freedom of Speech: A Treatise on the First Amendment § 2.05[3] (M. Bender, 1994).
Before Burstyn, the Court did not contemplate protection of art. See generally John
Wertheimer, Mutual Film Reviewed. The Movies, Censorship, and Free Speech in Progressive
America, 37 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 158 (1993).
123. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)) (recognizing that "the lewd and obscene ... are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas'); Board of Ed., Island Trees Union Free School Dist.
No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (emphasizing the "right to receive ideas" in the context
of invalidating a school district's decision to ban certain literary works); Young v. American Mini
Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976) (finding "a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition
of material that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in the
free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance"); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S.
483, 487 (1973) (noting the defendant's argument that "the film had social, literary, and artistic
importance in... providing observations 'about the political and social situation in this country
today' "); Miller, 413 U.S. at 34-35 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))
('The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social change"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) (determining that the "right to receive information and ideas... is fundamental to our
free society" (citation omitted)); Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))
(observing that the First Amendment guarantees liberty of human expression to preserve a
"free trade in ideas"); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961) (determining, where
petitioner claimed that "the nature of the film is irrelevant, and that even if this film contains
the basest type of pornography ... it may nonetheless be shown without prior submission for
examination," and that "it has never been held that liberty of speech is absolute"); Kingsley
International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) (finding that New York had
prohibited "the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture advocates an idea ... [y]et
the First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas"); Farmers Educational
& Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959) (noting that Congress had recognized
that the "art of radio broadcasting" is an important medium for communicating political ideas);
Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501 (concluding that "[tihe importance of motion pictures as an organ of
public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to in-
form'.
But see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (noting "the well nigh univer-
sal belief that good books, plays, and art lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human
personality, and develop character"). In addition, one case in dicta has recognized the emotive
value of expression. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1971).
124. 1995 WL 638797 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1995).
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nance on first amendment and fourteenth amendment grounds. They
lost in large part because the court drastically undervalued art
speech. Judge Cedarbaum acknowledged that "[a]rt is enormously
important in advancing civilization," but erroneously reasoned that
the encouragement of artistic activity was beyond the court's respon-
sibility.125 Thus, she ruled that the pictorial art at issue deserved less
protection than political speech, reasoning as follows:
Items bearing words that express political or religious views are much closer to
the heartland of First Amendment protection of "speech" than the apolitical
paintings in these cases. . . Although some art may be very close to "Pure
speech"... plaintiffs' art does not carry either words or the particularized so-
cial and political messages upon which the First Amendment places special
value.
12 6
Judge Cedarbaum has captured the prevailing attitude toward art, an
attitude that completely misses art's instrumental function in the
constitutional scheme. While the Court has extended first amend-
ment protection to works whose form defies a search for readily iden-
tifiable ideas, such as music or nude dancing,127 it has never taken up
the task of explaining why such works deserve protection even though
they do not contribute to a marketplace of ideas per se.
The Court's treatment of the Speech Clause tends to devalue
the extrarational, nondiscursive elements of art because its doctrine
places so much freight upon ideas. According to the Court, the First
Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.128 The marketplace of ideas paradigm, which permeates the
speech cases, tends to undervalue art by only recognizing its political,
rational, discursive potential.129 For example, one of the most quoted
lines in the Court's first amendment jurisprudence is Justice
Brennan's statement in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan identifying "a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
125. Id. at *1 ("How the flowering of art is best encouraged in our society is not an issue for
the court").
126. Id. at *5.
127. See, for example, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Iusic, as a
form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment); Schad v.
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (holding that "entertainment [such as nude dancing], as
well as political and ideological speech, is protected" by the First Amendment); Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (same); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (same).
128. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
129. See note 123 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court's cases have
valued art only for its perceived message). See also Nahmod, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. at 221 (cited in
note 7).
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issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.' ' 30 On these terms,
art-with its indirect and more subtle means of communica-
tion-appears to be a weak stepsister to reasoned argument, which
justifies itself by proving the political content and strength of its
message. The Court tends to measure art by its similarities to ordi-
nary speech, rather than by its distinctive structural function that
cannot be reduced to the terms of ordinary communication. 13, Even
those cases that deal directly with art speech bisect art into message
and medium. For example, in Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 32 the Court
explicitly recognized first amendment protection for motion pictures,
but only on the ground that they are "organ[s] of public opin-
ion... designed... to inform."'' 3
Indeed, the Court's general speech doctrine, which examines
laws according to whether they are content-based, content-neutral, or
viewpoint-based,'4 similarly begs the question of why one would pro-
tect art in the first place by presuming that the phenomenon should
be separated from an internal message. Although these categories
serve a legitimate function, their domination of the Court's doctrine
serves to obscure art's capacities beyond the delivery of a rationally
apprehendable message.
The one instance where the Court has apparently valued art
for its contribution to society is in the obscenity cases. Obscene works
130. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)
('ilnder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas"); Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 688 ("[New York has prohibited] the
exhibition of a motion picture because that picture advocates an idea . . . [yet] the First
Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas"); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
1, 4 (1949) ("The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discus-
sion.... The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs ... sets us
apart from totalitarian regimes'; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) ('The greater the
importance of safeguarding the community from [incitements to overthrow the government], the
more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional right of free speech ... to
maintain the opportunity for free political discussion).
131. See Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (Free Press, 1993)
(dividing the speech doctrine into a "tripartite system" of restrictions on speech: content-neu-
tral, content-based, and viewpoint-based). The Court has made a similar error in its free
exercise of religion doctrine wherein it has privileged belief (treated as an idea) and concomi-
tantly failed to provide adequate protection for religious conduct. See Hamilton, 54 Ohio St. L.
J. at 713, 722 (cited in note 8).
132. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
133. Id. at 501.
134. See Sunstein, Democracy at 210 (cited in note 131).
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are not accorded any first amendment protection. 135  In Miller v.
California,136 the Court declared a three-part test for determining
whether purportedly obscene materials were obscene as a matter of
law. According to the test, any work that is arguably obscene will be
deemed not to be obscene if it has "serious... artistic... value.' '137
Although it has been willing to employ aesthetic value in this defen-
sive mechanism, the Court has never pursued the implications of this
line of reasoning to protect art on grounds distinguishable from the
grounds normally offered to protect ideas.138
Existing theories provide only fragile protection for the range
of works of art. Because a significant number of artworks can be
construed to have discursive content, existing theories of art's first
amendment content undeniably provide protection to a degree. By
basing art's protection on its discursive content, however, these theo-
ries compel the courts to find such content in every work of art and
force them to struggle with artworks whose communicative essence is
135. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
136. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
137. Id. at 24.
138. For a discussion of how the obscenity doctrine should be transformed to ensure that
the Court's doctrine does not devalue art's challenge capacities, see Part IV.A.2.
In addition, those cases plainly involving governmental regulation of artworks-the
copyright and trademark parody cases-are curiously devoid of any searching inquiry into the
First Amendment's treatment of art. See, for example, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114
S. Ct. 1164, 1179 (1994) (finding that 2 Live Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh Pretty Woman"
may be a fair use within the meaning of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994 ed.), without
delving into the first amendment arena); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub.
Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1989) (presuming that "parody is a form of artistic ex-
pression, protected by the First Amendment" in deciding plaintiff's trademark infringement
claim); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1187-88
(5th Cir. 1979) (stating, without further elaboration, that "[tjhe First Amendment is not a
license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property); Walt Disney
Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1978) (dismissing the defendants' first
amendment claim with a summary discussion of the relationship between copyright and the
First Amendment); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating "as
a general proposition... that parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom-both as
entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism" and deciding the copyright claim
with no explicit first amendment discussion); Yankee Pub., Inc. v. News America Pub., Inc., 809
F. Supp. 267, 272, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (determining that the defendant's interest in "artistic
expression, parody, comedy, or commentary of a type protected by the First Amendment" far
outweighed any injury caused by infringement of the plaintiffs' trademark rights whether or not
deemed a parody because "parody is merely an example of the types of expressive content that
are favored in fair use analysis under the copyright law and First Amendment deference under
the trademark law"); Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First
Amendment Analysis, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1079, 1108-12 (1986) (noting that "[n]otwithstanding an
occasional acknowledgement of the 'right of satirical expression,' the courts have for the most
part ignored the constitutional implications of prohibiting trademark parody" (footnote omit-
ted)).
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nondiscursive and nonrational. 139 Moreover, the existing regime
forces the courts into a case-by-case analysis of the constitutional
value of every work of art. Dance, for example, has proved particu-
larly difficult for the Supreme Court.140
While art can address and work through rational faculties, it is
neither limited to nor dependent upon them, and even empowers such
faculties to subvert their own assumptions. Art stands on much
firmer ground if its capacity to communicate nondiscursively is
recognized alongside its capacity to carry a more explicit and readily
comprehensible message. The crabbed understanding of
communication in existing first amendment jurisprudence should be
transformed to include art's nondiscursive, perspective-enlarging
capacities.
In sum, no one has, as of yet, provided theoretical support for
the proposition that the nonrational, nondiscursive elements of art
are important to the republican democratic enterprise. Nor has any-
one explained how the experience of art-as opposed to the intellec-
tual receipt of its apparent message-might further the democratic
project. This Article offers such a theory.
2. Transforming the Doctrine to Protect the Nonrational,
Nondiscursive Elements of Art
Art-like religion, political speech, the press, assembly, and
grievance redress-is essential to freedom from the entrenched insti-
tutionalization of government.' 4, No less than any other mode of ex-
139. See notes 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing a case involving art street
vendors' challenge to a city licensing ordinance).
140. Compare Dallas u. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (categorizing an association for the
purpose of recreational dancing as beyond the First Amendment's protection), with Schad, 452
U.S. at 66 (stating that nude dancing is accorded first amendment protection); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (plurality opinion) (stating that nude dancing for enter-
tainment is "marginally" protected as "within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment");
id. at 585 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring) (indicating that nude dancing in a context other than
entertainment, such as in "a production of 'Hair' or 'Equus"' would present a different first
amendment question); id. at 592-93 (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that nude dancing, even
for entertainment, generates "thoughts, ideas, and emotions [that are) the essence of
communication" and therefore deserves the "most exacting scrutiny" (citation omitted)).
141. The best government is the government that governs least intrusively. People ideally
want to lead their daily lives. The key value to be sought is freedom from government. This
point was eloquently stated by playwright Wu Zuguang, speaking about China's Cultural
Revolution: "[I] thirst for freedom. Why exactly are we scared? Because they won't leave us
alone. So I long for an environment where I can be left alone. That for me is freedom." Ross
Terrill, China in Our Time: The Epic Saga of the People's Republic from the Communist Victory
to Tiananmen Square and Beyond 318 (Simon & Schuster, 1992). Carl Schmitt had the same
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pression encompassed by the Speech Clause, art is a lifespring of
liberty in the face of representative democracy. Each category of the
First Amendment operates differently in and through human exis-
tence; each is necessary to accompany its corollary human capacity to
bring existing governmental structures to account.
To realize art's full contribution to the First Amendment's task
of shoring up counterweights to government, the doctrine must ele-
vate art's value to the pinnacle of first amendment protection as it
recognizes art's extrarational value. The obscenity cases in particular
require transformation under this formulation. Before concluding that
a particular work is obscene and therefore unprotected, the Court
currently asks whether a work has "serious... artistic ... value."142
By insisting on "serious" value, the Court opens wide the way to
suppressing scores of artistic works143 The history of artistic
suppression proves that government should not have this power.
144
The Court should return to its earlier recognition that "[t]he portrayal
of sex... in art, literature, and scientific works, is not itself sufficient
reason to deny [this] material the constitutional protection of freedom
of speech and press."'145 Rather than making obscenity the threshold
consideration, the doctrine should ask first whether the work or sym-
bolic conduct is communication, including not only discursive speech
or conduct but also art's nondiscursive communicative elements that
resound as much in the spirit and imagination as in the intellect.
While artistic communication involving sexual imagery is currently
protected at the margins of the obscenity label, such art speech pos-
insight but took it to a false conclusion. Schmitt erred in his belief that a dictatorship could be
the only path to freedom from government. Schmitt, Political Theology at 66 (cited in note 32).
As I have argued elsewhere, totalitarianism is not the only alternative to liberalism's belief in
rule by individuals. Rather, a limited representative democracy creates the possibility for
freedom from government in Schmitt's sense without the submissiveness required of citizens in
a dictatorship. See Hamilton, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at Part III (cited in note 23); Hamilton, 29 Ga.
L. Rev. at Part I (cited in note 21) (discussion religion's challenge function).
142. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
143. This was in fact the intention of the drafters of the amendments to the grantmaking
regulations for the National Endowment for the Arts, which prohibit the funding of art depicting
"sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in
sex acts, which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." Act of Oct. 23, 1989, § 304, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 741-42 (1989).
144. See generally Edward deGrazia, Girls Lean Back Everywhere: The Law of Obscenity
and the Assault on Genius (Random House, 1992); Roth, 354 U.S. at 495 (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring) ('The history of the application of laws designed to suppress the obscene demonstrates
convincingly that the power of government can be invoked under them against great art or
literature, scientific treatises, or works exciting social controversy. Mistakes of the past prove
that there is a strong countervailing interest to be considered in the freedoms guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments").
145. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
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sesses the same insurgent capacities as nonsexual artistic communi-
cation and commands strong first amendment protection.
Explicitly recognizing the First Amendment's protection of
art's nondiscursive elements would require the Court to break
through the rigidity of the marketplace of ideas formulation. Such a
move, however, is dictated by the First Amendment's larger mission
against governmental intrusion into private liberties. Like religion,
protection of art should not follow solely from the protection of a
market for ideas or rational discourse. Ideas, surely, are important to
the First Amendment's scheme, but focusing the inquiry solely upon
ideas limits the Court's capacity to embrace fully art's unique
contribution to the private sphere, which the First Amendment sets
over against the government.
The Court should consciously elevate art to the top of the First
Amendment's pyramid of protection, alongside political speech. There
will be times when it is political speech, but even when it is not, it
furthers the constitutional goal of placing parameters around gov-
ernment. The Court should reject attempts to fit art into the existing
speech paradigms, which devalue its distinctive challenge capacities.
Limiting first amendment protection to idea protection misses the
fullness of the First Amendment's mission against tyranny. Rather
than fitting all other types of first amendment interests into the exist-
ing rational speech paradigm, the democratic propensities of the
particular expression should be identified in light of the First
Amendment's challenge functions. Art, political speech, philosophy,
and religion deserve first amendment protection geared to their
respective instrumental functions.
To return to the thesis with which this Article began, republi-
can democracy is best served by keeping government from meddling
with art. Those who advocate governmental regulation and
censorship of art for the greater good routinely fail to take into
account the importance of the subversive, defamiliarizing value of art
to the ongoing project of liberty.146 A culture rich in a variety of
artworks presses back the ever-encroaching reach of governmental
ideology. Thus, the Constitution requires that government steer clear
of meddling in the art world unless it can prove a compelling interest
and no alternative means of regulating the particular issue.
146. Compare with Amy Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography and the Problem
for Artistic Expression, 84 Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996) (criticizing the views of Catharine
Macainnon and Andrea Dworkin).
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The suggestion has been made that speech should be protected
from governmental intervention because it is property.147  This is
decidedly not why art speech should be protected. Art speech
deserves protection against governmental interference because its
flourishing furthers the intangible and unquantifiable value of
increasing the people's capacity to resist hegemony. One need not
transform speech into property in order to conclude that
governmental intervention is unacceptable. Much more important in
arguing against governmental intervention in the artworld is an ade-
quate and clear understanding of the interlocking relationship be-
tween representation and liberty.
Finally, it is difficult to overemphasize the point that the First
Amendment only contemplates restrictions on the government. In the
end, the Constitution is a rather small instrument in the grand
scheme of things. A church, a club, a private school, or a family
should be free to wield their private capacities-both financial and
moral-to support or to boycott any particular artwork. Let the suc-
ceeding art cater to them or criticize them and, more importantly, let
it defamiliarize them to their closely held assumptions. But do not let
the government, with its force and authority, block the path from the
familiar to the new.
B. Public Funding and Art
Art's subversive role in a representative democracy suggests
that the government's involvement in the creation of new art ought to
be carefully scrutinized and, comcomitantly, that arts education
should be a priority.
1. Governmental Subsidization of Art
In the direct democracy of ancient Athens, public support of
the arts led to classic examples of effective and stinging criticism of
the community's leaders.148 This is the result toward which art's sub-
147. John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 49 (forthcoming 1996).
148. See, for example, Aristophanes, 2 Knights (Aris & Phillips, Alan H. Sommerstein ed.
and trans. 1981) (attacking the powerful demagogue Cleon and parodying Generals
Demonthenes and Nicios while winning first prize at the Lenaea, a religious festival where the
most important occurrence was the presentation of dramatic performances); Aristophanes,
Acharnians (Aris & Phillips, Alan H. Sommerstein ed. and trans. 1980) (criticizing General
Lamachus and also winning first prize at the Lenaea). See also Lowell Edmunds, Cleon,
Knights, and Aristophanes' Politics (U. Press of America, 1987).
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versive character aims. If one were to identify the American culture
as a system of self-government, one might be tempted to cite Athens's
direct democracy as an example that argues in favor of the National
Endowment for the Arts ("NEA"). The American experiment with
democracy, however, is a representative democracy, calling for more
careful vigilance of the government, including its administrative
decisions in the spheres of expression. In the art context, therefore,
the NEA deserves intense scrutiny.
The Constitution does not make arts funding a per se violation.
While the Establishment Clause suggests that it is unconstitutional
for the government to make direct payments to religion,149 no
corresponding arts Establishment Clause exists to provide support for
the argument that direct subsidization of new artworks is per se
unconstitutional. As a matter of constitutional theory, then, Congress
is arguably left with some leeway to engage in constitutionally
sanctioned arts funding. Yet, as an empirical matter, this looks
impossible.
The United States has experimented with two approaches to
governmental arts funding in the twentieth century. During the
Depression, the federal government provided comprehensive support
for artists. More recently, it has provided limited grants for particu-
lar projects under the NEA. Neither effort has been a success.
In response to the Depression, President Franklin Roosevelt
created the Works Progress Administration ("WPA") in the summer of
1935. The WPA provided massive governmental funding to put
Americans back to work. Although only a small percentage of that
funding was earmarked for artists, its "impact on the artistic commu-
nity was diluvial."'' -5
The Federal Arts Project ("FAP") provided living wages, stu-
dios, supplies, and patrons for thousands of artists and would-be
artists. As a result, there was a massive shift in the number of those
claiming to be artists 5s and draconian governmental directives on
creative activity were instituted, which led to lesser quality artwork.
149. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2523, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1995) ("[We have recognized special Establishment Clause dangers
where the government makes direct money payments to sectarian institutions" (citations
omitted)); id. at 2533-34 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's holding as allowing a
first amendment violation by extending governmental funding to a religious organization).
150. Steven Naifeh and Gregory White Smith, Jackson Pollock: An American Saga 275
(C.N. Potter, 1989).
151. In New York City, it is estimated that the number of artists increased ten-fold under
the FAP. See id. at 273.
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Painters were forced to choose whether to do murals or easel painting,
subjected to productivity quotas, and those choosing the latter were
subject to a "'force account,' which required [them] to show up at a
supervised location, check in, and paint for a specified number of
hours each week."'152 Because murals were required to have sponsors,
and sponsors preferred conservative approaches, murals tended to be
"flat wall decorations of the lowest order."153
Not only did the FAP foster mediocre works, it also increased
tensions within the artistic community. The FAP's comprehensive
support of artists' needs brought the artistic community more closely
together than ever, which ironically rent it asunder as competition
between artists increased and hostilities resulted. At the same time,
it drove a wedge between artists and the public by paying artists more
than many other members of society.15
Most important for this Article, the FAP proved that the gov-
ernment and the artistic community are not natural allies. Even as
they enjoyed the rather princely sums they were being paid by the
government, artists attempted to subvert the government's regula-
tions at many points. They resisted the requirement that they work
on demand in government-owned studios, chafed under the required
governmental inspections, disdained work quotas, and pilfered the
government's art supplies. 55 As one artist put it, 'The government
was going to civilize us, only we didn't want to be civilized in that
way. It was a real clash of cultures.' 156 By 1941, the WPA neared its
demise. "After 2,500 murals, 17,000 pieces of sculpture, 108,000 easel
paintings, and 240,000 prints, public tolerance and government
money had finally run out.' 157 Massive federal funding had provided
artists and artist-aspirants with paying artistic jobs. In light of the
mediocrity of the vast majority of works created, artists probably
would have made a more valuable contribution to the culture as
dishwashers, cooks, and janitors for various governmental agencies
and offices.
An enthusiastic but naive Congress created the NEA in 1965,
at a time when the country believed it had become a "major artistic
power in the world," to encourage further "free inquiry and expres-
152. Id. at 274-76.
153. Id. at 275 (quoting a letter from Sande Pollock).
154. Id. at 276-77.
155. Id. at 274-76, 364.
156. Id. at 274.
157. Id. at 364.
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sion.' '1 Members of Congress spoke of the importance of art in a
democracy, 159 but failed to grasp that art's importance in a represen-
tative democracy lies in its response to and independence from gov-
ernment. They declared that "it is essential to provide financial assis-
tance to... artists and the organizations that support their work,'160
which surely it is, but they did not engage in fact-finding to determine
whether the government has a compelling interest in funding art. The
creation of a federal arts bureaucracy has not served the end of "free
inquiry." To the contrary, federal funding has tended to direct artistic
energy away from the production of new and interesting works toward
the creation of mediocre works.161
Peer review panels are composed of those artists who have
already succeeded: the status quo of the art world. The "new" is
automatically discounted in this environment and originality is
sacrificed. 62  The arts bureaucracy invites lobbying and safe
govbrnmental investment instead of cutting-edge artistic
development.163 The government's funding decisions even affect the
way in which the private arts market operates. Corporate America,
inevitably conservative in its spending decisions, has preferred art
bearing the federal government's imprimatur.'6 The work's market
value becomes a tainted amalgam of some modicum of aesthetic value
and governmental approval. Were the NEA's budget $2 billion, the
158. National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities, Debates on S.1483, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., in 111 Cong. Rec. 13103, 13107-11 (June 10, 1965). See Art Critic Says it's Time to
Stop Funding the Arts, on National Public Radio, All Things Considered (March 14, 1995)
(statement of art critic Hilton Kramer).
159. "[It is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to help create and
sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry but also
the material conditions facilitating the release of ... creative talent." 20 U.S.C. § 951(7) (1994
ed.). "Democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens. It must therefore foster and
support a form of education, and access to the arts and the humanities, designed to make people
of all backgrounds and wherever located masters of their technology and not its unthinking
servants." Id. § 951(4). "It is vital to a democracy to honor and preserve its multicultural artis-
tic heritage as well as support new ideas, and therefore it is essential to provide financial assis-
tance to its artists and the organizations that support their work." Id. § 951(10).
160. Id. § 951(10).
161. Art Critic, on National Public Radio, All Things Considered (cited in note 158).
162. Lynne A. Munson, Art by Committee, N.Y. Times A23 (Sept. 21, 1995) (quoting Joseph
Epstein, member of the National Council on the Arts, which reviews every NEA grant) (stating
that NEA grants fall into "three categories: 'the mediocre, the political and the obscene' "); Art
Critic, on National Public Radio, All Things Considered (cited in note 158).
163. Art Critic, on National Public Radio, All Things Considered (cited in note 158).
164. Nadine Strossen, Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight for
Women's Rights 103 (Scribner, 1995) ("Support from the NEA has served as a seal of approval
for art, which in the past had been seen as a 'safe' investment or contribution for conservative
corporate and individual donors").
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market-skewing potential of governmental arts funding would be
easily identified. Only the inconsequential size of the NEA budget
has permitted the NEA's participation in the marketplace to seem
like benign assistance rather than the coercion of culture that it is.165
Even slight governmental funding can shift an arts organiza-
tion's mission away from aesthetic development toward other social
goals approved by the government. As a result, the variety and qual-
ity of cultural contributions is reduced. The NEA has favored particu-
lar causes, such as AIDS awareness and multiculturalism.166 These
political goals chill original artistic expression in favor of expression
pandering to the government's agenda. For example, the Painted
Bride Art Center in Philadelphia spent several years attempting to
recast itself as a community arts outreach program in response to the
tenor of federal and private funding.16 7 As it did so, it lost sight of its
original mission to present cutting-edge work. With the state and
federal governments reducing spending, the Painted Bride has re-
assessed its artistic mission and returned to its original project: sup-
porting avant garde work. The reduction in governmental giving has
resulted in the recapture of an arts-driven mission that was derailed
by a governmental agenda.
Some support governmental funding of the arts for the purpose
of adding diverse voices to the artistic mix, on the theory that such
voices would not be heard otherwise. Yet, the argument that federal
funding of the arts is necessary for minority voices to be heard is
hopelessly circular. If minority voices have found a haven in the fed-
eral government, they have proven political muscle. Ironically, fed-
eral recognition disproves the need for the funding.
The NEA has become "hopelessly politicized," with purportedly
neutral peer review panels recommending grants based on political
agendas rather than aesthetic merit. 168 While acknowledging the
failure of the current system, some might argue that the NEA should
simply reform itself into a more neutral arbiter of grant proposals.
The adversarial nature of the relationship between government and
art delineated above, however, makes such a hope unlikely to be ful-
filled. Unless the governmental organization can prove its decisions
165. For budget information, see National Endowment for the Arts, History of
Authorizations and Appropriations (1994); National Endowment for the Arts, FY94 and FY95
Budgets.
166. Munson, N.Y. Times at A23 (cited in note 162).
167. Stephan Salisbury, The Painted Bride's Going Fiscally Lean as it Zeroes in on Its
Artistic Mission, Phila. Inq. D1, D6 (Sept. 25, 1995).
168. Munson, N.Y. Times at A23 (cited in note 162).
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are based solely on aesthetic criteria, arts funding should be (and has
been) declared unconstitutional.169 Indeed, where the instrumental
value of art lies in its capacity to question and undermine the status
quo, the art experts on whom the government would have to depend
in such a scheme seem ill-placed. The American experiment with
such funding bodes ill for the success of such an enterprise.
The problems posed by federal governmental funding of art are
equally apparent at the state and local level. Once a local funding
system is in place, state and local officials are as tempted as federal
officials to encourage some messages and images and to discourage
others. For example, Bucks County, Pennsylvania, which has always
had a strong arts community, has a tradition of choosing a poet
laureate, using independent poetry experts. Poet laureates receive
$300, the title, and most important, opportunities to showcase their
work for a year. Given the small market for poetry in general, the
poet laureate program significantly impacts the market. Recent
laureates have chosen topics of relevance to county residents-AIDS,
sewers, and roadkill-which do not please county officials. As a
result, officials are searching for a means of ridding county-supported
poetry of offensive elements and are considering instituting guidelines
to ensure more "uplifting" poetry.170
Like federal funding under the FAP, the marriage between
government and the arts is a troubled one at the local level. Officials
169. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1476 (C.D.C.A. 1992)
(holding unconstitutionally vague a requirement that a proposal pass a "decency" criterion);
Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 785 (C.D.C.A. 1991)
(holding unconstitutional a requirement that grantees certify that their works will not be
obscene). See Enrique R. Carrasco, The National Endowment for the Arts: A Search for an
Equitable Grant Making Process, 74 Georgetown L. J. 1521, 1532-43 (1986) (noting that
Congress's amendments reflect a willingness to consider factors other than artistic excellence,
which include an emphasis on the importance of minority participation in the NEA); Shipley, 40
Emory L. J. at 256-257 (cited in note 120) (discussing congressional changes made to the NEA's
grantmaking process that demonstrate Congress's willingness to consider factors other than
"generalized artistic excellence," including minority recognition).
Art is also weakened when it is forced to abide by affirmative action schemes implemented
in the private sphere.
Whatever its impact on education or its success in minority communities, the new
coercive philanthropy is demoralizing many artists and artistic institutions. The entire
cultural world is bending itself into contortions in order to find the right shape for
grants under the new criteria.... By forcing artistic expression to become a conduit for
social justice and equal opportunity instead of achieving these goals through basic
humane legislation, we are distracting our artists and absolving our politicians.
Robert Brustein, Culture by Coercion, N.Y. Times A25, A25 (Nov. 29, 1994).
170. Kathy Boccella, Laureates' Verse Grates on Some Ears, Phila. Inq. Al, A12 (Dec. 11,
1995).
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fear offending particular constituencies, and therefore they are
inclined to favor art that takes the middle ground: mild, prosaic, and
safe. In contrast, the high-quality poets chosen have been more
interested in questioning the status quo. The content guidelines
suggested by the officials plainly violate the First Amendment and
further illustrate why governmental funding for the arts is not good
for art and is therefore not good for the people.
A wide berth for both religion and art are essential to a free
society. Governmental funding of either, however, threatens the pri-
vate sphere of freedom safeguarded by the First Amendment. In a
diverse society, the establishment of an official art is an evil that
should be avoided as assiduously as the establishment of an official
religion. Such establishment directly threatens the scope of power
individuals can exercise over their respective private spheres and
therefore against the public sphere. NEA funding has not served the
end to which it is directed-free inquiry-and cannot do so.
The vast majority of arts project funding has been provided by
the private sector. In the absence of the NEA, such funding will con-
tinue and even increase. Moreover, the art market shows no signs of
slowing down. There seems to be an endless supply of best-selling
novels, popular motion pictures, and graphics. Recent fine art auc-
tions set records for prices paid for particular works, and arts funding
has recently experienced an upsurge.171
In short, we do not need the NEA and we certainly do not need
a reprise of the FAP. The important question left to be answered is
whether government can or should assist in ensuring that valuable
artworks are created. One might argue that we have numbers of
artworks, even too many works, but we are short on high quality
works. As an empirical matter, such a view should be taken with a
grain of salt. Hundreds of years behind European and Asian cultures,
the American polity has long been apologetic about its high cultural
offerings as compared to those cultures.172 At the end of the twentieth
century, however, much exists in the American artworld to be praised.
171. William Grimes, "Business Said to Put More in Arts," N.Y. Times C15 (Oct. 12, 1995);
Stephen Salisbury, By One Measure: Giving to the Arts Has Increased Since '89, Phila. Inq. C1
(Dec. 6, 1995) (citing a survey that shows a 20% increase in arts philanthropy, thereby
debunking the "very strong presumption on the part of the cultural community that grant
making to arts and culture was going down'.
172. Compare Joseph J. Ellis, After the Revolution: Profiles of Early American Culture
(Norton, 1979) (describing disappointment in American artistic offerings in the early-eighteenth
century after many had predicted and expected a dramatic flowering of the arts following the
Revolution).
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Although government can do little to ensure the high quality of
artworks in general, one profitable area of inquiry resides in copyright
law. A full explanation of the operation of copyright law vis-a-vis
artworks is well beyond the scope of this Article, but, as a preliminary
matter, the requirement that copyrighted works be "original" may
play an important role in creating a cultural milieu within which the
highest quality works are encouraged. I leave further elaboration to a
later Article.
2. Arts Education in the Public Schools
Although art's subversiveness encourages skepticism of the
government's decision to fund the creation of new art, it recommends
arts education. If a sufficient variety of aesthetic experiences were
provided to children, they could gather a store of reorientation
experiments valuable in later life, and just as important, learn to seek
out further aesthetic experiences. As indicated by the Babbitt
hypothetical above, literature classes have always contributed in this
way.
The particular methods by which public schools should teach
about art are well beyond the scope of this Article. It is worthwhile to
note, however, that the undervaluation of the arts is well reflected in
arts education. Consistent with Enlightenment values, more is
known about science education than is known about arts education.
And more is known about art productivity than arts education. 173
American schools have encouraged students to create artistic works
but have done very little to foster aesthetic understanding or
appreciation. Thus, crafting a successful, liberty-enriching arts
education is a frontier challenge for the schools. The task is well
worth the effort, however. And it may be getting marginally easier in
the Information Era. As more artworks become available through
online services, the opportunities for creative arts education increase.
A richer arts education should lead to more appreciation of art
and therefore more private funding and a more vital artistic culture.
Taking government out of the matrix promises a more independent
artworld as well. Ironically, the public funding of arts education
enriches the power of the private sphere over and against the gov-
ernment. This is no paradox, however. The regimes of China, Nazi
173. Gardner, Art Education at 50 (cited in note 5).
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Germany, and Eastern Europe illustrate that governmental control of
arts access augments governmental control in general.174
On this score, however, it is important to distinguish between
inculcation by the arts and arts education. Ideological inculcation
arises where artistic works are chosen (or rejected) according to a
singular political message.175 A narrowly constrained arts education,
with its repetitive reference to a predominant world view, may be
more dangerous in some respects than no arts education at all. In
contrast, a sufficiently nondogmatic arts education provides both a
storehouse of reorientation experiences to draw upon and training of
the emotions, intellect, and imagination to test and resist status quo
worlds.
The constitutional importance of variety in arts education
raises the specter of school censorship. As I have done throughout
this Article, I will make an explicit analogy to religion jurisprudence.
Despite the. Establishment Clause's plain admonition against relig-
ious proselytization by public schools,176 education about the history of
religion or theology is well within the public schools' prerogative.177
Analogously, tight governmental control over what art should be
taught and distributed risks tyranny,178 but does not counsel against a
thoughtfully chosen program introducing students to artworks and
teaching them about the history of art and its qualities. Just as there
have been first amendment challenges to school district decisions to
174. See Part III.
175. See notes 108-15 and accompanying text (discussing totalitarian regimes).
176. See, for example, Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.
Ct. 2481, 2490, 129 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1994) (determining that the legislature's carving out of a
public school district which coincides with a Jewish Satmar Hasidic community violates the
Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466-69, 125
L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993) (finding that a state-funded interpreter in a sectarian school does not violate
the Establishment Clause because the state program was neutrally administered to all schools
and did not encourage parents to choose sectarian schools over nonsectarian schools); Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) (holding that inviting clergy to recite benedictions at
public school graduation ceremonies violates the Establishment Clause because the school
officials determined whether such religious prayers should be delivered and selected the
religious presenter); Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 253 (1990) (concluding that the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1994 ed.), which
allows equal access to school facilities for student groups, does not violate the Establishment
Clause when the student group is a religious group).
177. See Brief for Respondents 14-15, 25, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1995).
178. See Part III (discussing Eastern Europe, Nazi Germany, and Communist China). See
also Gardner, Arts Education at 35 (cited in note 5) (stating that artworks were displayed in
nineteenth-century American schools to promote "patriotism, moral conduct, or broad
philosophical themes").
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include or refuse to include certain works of literature,1' 9 there are
likely to be analogous charges brought with respect to art. Better to
have progressed to the stage of working through such decisions, how-
ever, than to have left arts education behind altogether.
V. CONCLUSION
Most people enjoy art in some form, and many have argued in
favor of its protection under the First Amendment. Yet to date no one
has justified its protection beyond its discursive content. In addition
to its content, art deserves constitutional protection for its singular
capacity to offer the experience of new worlds and therefore new
perspectives on the status quo. Its experience strengthens judgment,
resistance, and the capacity for dissent. Thus, art plays an important
and distinctive instrumental role in the calibration of governmental
and private liberty.
The Constitution presumes the possibility and even the likeli-
hood that representatives, and therefore government, will abuse their
granted powers and suppress the people's liberty. The main text of
the Constitution provides a set of mechanisms intended to prevent
any one person, office, or branch of government from amassing over-
weening power. The colonists, however, viewed the existence of those
mechanisms as inadequate by themselves to the task of limiting
governmental power. An explicit bill of rights was required if a
private sphere of freedom was to be inviolate.
179. See, for example, Pico, 457 U.S. at 853 (invalidating a school district's decision to ban
nine literary works it deemed "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-[Semitic], and just plain
filthy"); Virgil v. School Bd. of Columbia County, Fla., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989)
(challenging a school board's removal of a previously approved textbook from an elective high
school class because of objections to the vulgarity and sexual explicitness of the material, which
included works by Chaucer and Aristophanes); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631
F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (arguing that a school's removal of books from certain courses and its
subsequent grant of a request to convey the books for a public burning violated students' first
and fourteenth amendment rights); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990) (arguing
that removing a Bible from the school library and ordering a teacher to remove two books from
her shelf violated the plaintiffs' first amendment rights of free speech, academic freedom, and
access to information). But see Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42
F.3d 719 (2d Cir. 1994) (addressing the plaintiffs first amendment challenge to a school admini-
stration's prohibition against using 'The Birth Scene," a portrayal of two women and one man
naked from the waist up, one of six 35mm film clips used to illustrate the "persistence of vision"
phenomenon in a guest lecture to a high school mathematics class); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d
214 (3rd Cir. 1981) (challenging a public school superintendent's decision to cancel a high school
dramatic production because of its sexual content).
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Along with the other enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights,
the First Amendment attempts to clear such a space for the people by
making it possible for them to construct power structures that can
compete with government for hegemony. Art, religion, philosophy,
and political debate each have their role in this struggle between the
governed and the governing.
Art plays a distinctive and important role in permitting citi-
zens to experience alien world views. A tightly controlled artistic
culture can be the handservant to tyranny. When art is free from
governmental coercion, however, it has the capacity to build resis-
tance to such oppression. Rather than being relegated to the margins
of first amendment jurisprudence, art should be given its due as one
of the pillars supporting the First Amendment's dedication to
freedom.
